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The intention of this thesis is to investigate from a criti-
cal point of view, the capitalist theory of regional and housing
development for developing countries, and the pratice of this
theory in Taiwan. Hopefully, this investigation will provide a
basis for architects and planners to understand that the housing
crisis in most worst developing countries like other social and
environmental problems, orginates in the social relation of the
society. As such crisis cannot be resolved merely by implementa-
tion of partial policies and strategies unless the very founda-
tion of social relations are changed.
Background information and analysis will be provided on
following questions:
What is the theory of regional and housing development for
developing countries within capitalist system?
What is Taiwan's experience in practising this theory of
regional and housing development?
How did the regional development strategy influence housing
development in theiry and in practice?
What is the major contradiction within developing society
which causes the failure of regional development and housing
development?
In Section I, a critical history of urban and regional
development in relation to the change of social structures and
social relations for the pre-19 4 9 period is presented, as the
basis of Taiwan's development under the capitalist theory.
Section II introduces the capitalist theory of regional and
housing development for a developing society. Taiwan's regional
and housing development experience in relation to social mode of
production under the influence of capitalist theory is then
investigated as an example of the implementation of the capitalist
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theory.
Section III focuses on the criticism of capitalist theory as
well as Taiwan's regional development strategy and housing develop-
ment. The criticism is established on the conventional theory of
political economy.
Professor Tunney Lee, Thesis Supervisor
Associate Professor of Architecture and Urba.n Planning
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A. Introduction
There were very few studies concerning Taiwan's development
before 1949. Prior to that time the studies were mostly under-
taken by the royal scholars and bureaucrats of the Japanese
ruling institute under the colonial government. The main purpose
of the studies were, therefore, to praise the ruling success of
Japanese imperialism, to defend the cruel exploitation and
suppression of the colony and to advocate continued invasion of
imperialism. In 1945 Taiwan was recovered from Japan, but the
same time civil war broke out on the Chinese mainland. Taiwan
was therefore ignored to a large extent by the Chinese govern-
ment until the latter retreated from the mainland to Taiwan in
1949. As a result, most of the social, economic and infrastruc-
tural bases for Taiwan's development were constructed primarily
under the aegis of the colonial government.
The whole history of Taiwan's development since the seven-
teenth century can be viewed as a history of exploitation and
suppression under the yokes of colonialism and imperialism.
Although Taiwan was discovered by the Chinese in the twelfth
century, there was no development on the island until the end of
sixteenth century. From 1624, Holland occupied Taiwan for forty-
eight years. During the same period, serious contradiction
existed in the society of mainland China. Dictatorial bureaucrats
of the Ming's dynasty, the landlords and usury combined in
forcing the peasant majority into famine, poverty, exile and
death. Peasant rebellions were occurring everywhere, and
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Manchurian troops were invading the country. Because of the war,
famine, oppression and death, about one hunderd thousand Chinese
migrated from the mainland to Taiwan. In 1662, a general of the
Ming dynasty expelled Holland's colonial rule and took over power
in Taiwan. However, in 1683, his son surrendered to the Ching
dynasty. Taiwan then became the territory of the Ching dynasty.
Before 1842 ( the year of the Opium War ), Taiwan was, like
the rest of China, a feudalistic society. Social relations and
social forces of production kept apace with the level of develop-
ment on the Chinese mainland. Great progress in development of
agriculture and manual trade was accomplished within this two
hundred years. The development of commercial capital indicated
the progress of primary capital accumulation. The major sugar
production factories took on the initial forms of capitalistic
operation. Many small local urban areas began to appear in both
the countryside and harbors along the west coast. The major func-
tions of these small urban areas were as local centers of commerce,
economy, politics, culture and transportation.
However, before capitalism had time to take hold in Chinese
society, foreign aggression invaded both Taiwan and the Chinese
mainland. The existing feudal system, established on the bases
of a combination of agriculture and manual trades, began to
undergo a process of disintegration. This unnatural collapse of
the old system did not give way to a new set of social relations
of production. Thus the characteristics of the Chinese society
within the past hundred years can be characterized as: (1) THE
POWERFUL DOMINATION OF FOREIGN CAPITALISM (2) THE GREAT
-8-
TRADITIONAL INFLUENCES OF FEUDALISTIC RELATION OF PRODUCTION.
This is generally the so-called nature of semi-colonial and
semi-feudalistic society.
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B. Development Within the Semi-Colonial And Semi-Feudalistic
Period
a. The Decline of New-Growing National Capitalism
During the ninteenth century, there was an increasing need
for the capitalistic countries to expand world trade. As a result,
the Chinese market, with its four million potential consumers
became very tempting to British. However, the resistance to
foreign intrusion was very strong within the social and economic
fabric of Chinese feudalism. This situation remained unchanged
until the late nineteen hundreds. Finally, the British found the
dynamite for destroying the Chinese feudalistic economic system
-- Opium. The import of opium changed the nature of foreign trade
in China. China fell accumulated into an unrepayable debt with
the increasing consumption of opium and the consequent unfavor-
able balance of trade. The Ching government tried to prohibit the
import of opium, but this became the British excuse for starting
war and imposing unfair treaties on China.
After the opium war, because of the intrusion of modern
foreign capitalism and the accumulation of foreign capital in
China, the economic system of Chinese feudalism began to fall
apart, and the beginning of national capital accumulation declined.
All of these factors killed the initial buds of natural capital-
istic development in China. The opium war marked the beginning
of Chinese modern history. The Chinese social system was changed
from a feudalistic to a semi-colonial and semi-feudalistic one.
As a component of China, the same transformation took place on
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Taiwan.
During the mid-nineteenth century, most of the imported
opium was consumed in Taiwan. The opium-poisoned population in
Taiwan had reached half a million. The opium profit of the
British merchants reached ten million dollars, most of which
came from Taiwan. For example, in 1885, Taiwan imported one
million and nine hundred thousand ounces of opium which composed
sixty percent of total imported opium ( three million and two
hundred thousand ounces ) in China. Within this period, Taiwan's
major import was opium, while its major export were tea, sugar,
rice, and camphor etc.
b. The Transformation of Social Relation of Production and
Agricultural Development
Like China, Taiwan underwent the collapse of a feudalistic
economic system and the decline of national capital accumulation.
With the intrusion of foreign capital, local commercial capital
became concentrated in the hands of a few. A new comprador class
thus emerged in the society. It is necessary to emphasize the
importance of the comprador class in the social relations of
procuation, as a medium between the Taiwanese peasants and the
foreign capitalists under the new economic system of exploitation
established by the foreign capitalism.
The compradors, together with feudalistic bureaucrats,
landlords and usury made tremendous profits by selling foreign
productions to poor peasants through the monopolized market. For
paying such extravagant levies, miscellaneous taxes and their
-11-
ever increasing rent, the peasants had to sell their products to
the market at a cheap price. These products in the market were
transformed into exported merchandise. Foreign monopolized
markets absorbed the peasants raw materials and agricultural
products into the capitalistic economy through the compradors
bureaucrats, landlords and the usury.
The new business of the so-called "Ma Chan Kuan" -- a
comprador enterprise -- in Taiwan's tea market is an example of
how compradors operated in that period. Ma Chan Kuan was the
organization of compradors acting as media between the foreign
business firms and the local tea factories in the market system
of Taiwan. According to the investigation in 1895, there were
twenty Ma Chan Kuan in Taiwan. They received loans from foreign
business firms and lent it to tea factories. The tea factories
then transferred these loans to the peasants. Usually, peasants
needed cash between the tea seasons or seasons of other agricul-
tural products. This is the only souce from which they could
borrow money. Once they were bound by these usury loans, they
had to sell their products to the tea factories, when the tea
was ready for saleat a price set by those foreign business firms.
During that period, several foreign business firms controlled the
market for tea and other major products in Taiwan. The compradors,
landlords and usury exploited and robbed the peasants by taking
advantage of the peasants' poor knowledge of marketing. However,
the invasion of foreign capitalism did not completely destroy the
feudalistic power in both Chinese and Taiwanese society. Instead,
elements of local feudalistic power were strengthened in order to
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serve foreign interests. Most of the comprador class arose under
these circumstances.
During that period, agricultural development in Taiwan was
completely dependent on the market. All the markets for major
agricultural products and productions such as tea, camphor, sugar,
and rice etc. were controlled by capitalists, feudalistic bureau-
crats, compradors, landlords and the -usury. All the surplus
profit went into the pocket of these exploitators. The situation
of Taiwanese peasants was extremely tragic. Davidson describes
the tragic life of the peasants in his book The Island of Formosa
"....if the payment is to be held up, his debts will
immediately increase rapidly...... if he is an honest man
and does not wish to improve his situation by finding other
ways of life, hw will work like a slave for debts until
he dies."
At the end of the nineteenth century, foreign capitalism
had developed to the stage of monopoly capitalism. The basic
characteristics of imperialism had already been outlined.
Constructions among the various foreign powers in the scramble
for colonies had became sharper. Corruption in the bureaucratic
government of Ching dynasty had also become rampant. Under this
situation, it was obviously very difficult for Taiwan to main-
tain its position as a semi-colony.
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C. Development Within The Colonial Period (I).
In 1868, reformation in Japanese feudalistic society began
because of the pressure of international capitalism. This is the
so-called "Meiji Restoration" in history. After the restoration
the ruling class of Japanese superstructure was reorganized by
the big landlords and capitalists. However, the contradictions
within the Japanese society did not disappear; instead, they
became sharper because of the feudalistic elements still existing
in large Japanese rural areas. This was the major obstacle to
the developement of Japanese capitalism. Furthermore, the
Japanese domestic market for capitalist development was also
very limited. In order to overcome the weakness and limitations
for capitalist development, the Japanese ruling class decided to
plunder colonies and seize the foreign market by military force.
The first invasions of Japanese imperialism took place in China,
mainly due to geographic conveniences.
After the Sino-Japanese war, Taiwan became a Japanese colony.
At that time, Japanese capitalism was still very weak, and capital
accumulation poor. Most of the industries in Japan were still
small-size enterprises, according to the investigation in 1893.
The major characteristic of development of Japanese capitalism
was, therefore, powerful assistance from feudalistic national
military institutions to the expansion of monopoly capital.
Although this also happened in the development of colonial Taiwan,
capital did not emerge from Taiwan society, but from Japanese
imperialism.
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a. Development of Land and Agriculture
For the development of Japanese imperialism, Taiwan became
the major source of supply of raw materials and food. Thus
production in colonial Taiwan emphasized agriculture and agricul-
tural processing industries. Table I-1 shows the figures of the
productive population, price of production and exports. These
figure illustrate the importance of agriculture in Taiwan
development within that period.
According to Table I-1, the ratio of the price of agricul-
tural production to that of total production decreased from 63%
in 1912 to 53% in 1935, regardless of the absolute increase in
the price of agricultural products. The major reason for this was
the rapid increase of the agricultural processing industry. For
example, in 1935, the gross income of industrial production was
256,000,000 Yuan, 32-3% of which came from agricultural processing
industries. The total income of the agricultural and agricultural
processing products occupied more than 85% of the total income
of production in Taiwan.
(i) Land Ownership and Distribution of Land
In order to understand the essence of agricultural
development in Taiwan at that period, it is necessary to review
the relationship of land ownership and distribution. The distri-
bution of cultivated land was very concentrated in Taiwan.
Moreover, the land was controlled by only a very small percent
of the population --- the landlords. With time this process of
land acquisition by the landlords developed more and more rapidly.
Table 1-2 indicates that the number of landowners with less than
one cha's cultivated land decreased from 254,642 in 1921 to
201,913 in 1932, and the number of landowners with more than ten
chas' land increased from 8,221 in 1921 to 9272 in 1932. This
figure illustrates the fact that the peasants and middle peasants
were losing their means of production during the process of
concentration of land ownership and land distribution.
But the figures in Table 1-2 do not show the extent of
cacentration of land ownership. According to investigations in
1921, 64.01% of the total landowners were peasants with less
than one cha's land and they owned only 14.35% of the total
cultivated land. The remaining 2.03% of landowners were the
landlords and the rich peasants with more than ten chas' land,
and they owned 35.8% of total cultivated land. Finally, 13.06%
of the total cultivated land were owned by 0.05% of the landowners
-- the big landlords and monopoly enterprises. (Table 1-3)
These figures show that most of the cultivated land were
concentrated in the hands of both the feudalistic landlords and
the Japanese monopoly enterprises. With the assistance of the
colonial ruling institutes, the land concentration in the hands
of monopoly enterprises grew much faster than that of the local
landlords. For example, the cultivated land owned by ten sugar
production companies increased from 63,246 chas in 1925 to 78,601
chas in 1926. This annexation process developed very rapidly
during that period. In 1939, the six big sugar production companies
under the control of Japanese capitalist owned 119,000 chas' cul-
tivated land which was 13.4% of the total cultivated land in Taiwan.
The rest of the ten Japanese monopoly companies owned 145,200
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chas land, which was 17.5% of the total cultivated land.
(ii) The Relation of Production
There were two kinds of agricultural operation under
the colonial system of rural development. One was the large-
scale cultivated operation under the control of Japanese
monopoly capital, the other was the small-scale agricultural
operation under the control of the feudalist landlords. The status
of the middle peasants was very unstable under the colonial system
of agricultural operation. Very few of them were free or inde-
pendent productive operators. Through the market exchange, they
lost their means of production because of the cruel exploitation
of monopoly capitalism and the colonial law of forced land-
collection and land-renting.
Most of the land of the landlords and monopoly enterprises
were cultivated by the tenants. Table 1-4 shows that the number
of the tenant units occupied 40% of the total farmer units. If
we include the number of semi-tenant units, the ratio between the
units of tenants and that of total farmers increased to 70%.
The semi-feudalistic relation of land ownership created the
landlords' exploitation of the tenants. This relationship was
established on three bases: rent, security deposit and commercial
usury. Rent was collected according to the lease between the land-
lord and tenant; but usually the lease was only verbal, and the
period of lease was uncertain. As a result, the landlords could
change the tenants or the term in the lease anytime. The lease
was mostly decided only by landlords. Sometimes, the rent was
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rigid, which meant the tenants had to pay a certain amount of
rent for each season regardless of the harvest. Security deposits
were also required. Sometimes when the rent of demanded land
reached the highest limit, the landlords would rent it to the
tenant that could afford the highest security deposit. Usury was
always parasitic on the semi-feudalistic relation of Taiwan's
agricultural system. Most of the time the landlords also operated
commercial money-lending businesses. They used the usury as a
means to strip every small and fragmented piece of land from the
poor peasants in rural areas. The commercial usury also established
the capital of the comprador class in rural areas. The appearence
of food business of the so-called "Tu Lung Chan" was a good example.
After World War I, because of the increasing demand for rice in
the Japanese domestic market, Taiwan shifted to the production
of the so-called "pon-lai rice". The function of "Tu Lung Chan"
was to transfer the crops from the hand of peasants to Japanese
monopoly enterprises such as Mitsui. They controlled the capital
for the agricultural development in the rural areas which included
that of most local landlords. Between the two paddy field crops,
the peasants usually needed cash for paying the first period rent
and buying fertilizer especially at the end of year. The business
organization of "Tu Lung Chan" was the only available place for
them to ask for help. The payment for this usury was by crops,
the price of which was decided by the organization and was usually
much lower than that after harvesting.
Let us review the relation of production under the large-
scale cultivated operation of Japanese monopoly capital. Before
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World War I, sugar cane was the major product in Taiwan's agri-
culture. In 1905,Japanese monopoly- capital became established
in what was termed 'augar cane cultivating regions", through the
assistance of colonial government. According to the regulation
of the agricultural department of the colonial government, the
peasants' production of sugar cane in certain regions were
assigned to be sold to certain modern sugar production factory,
and was prohibited from any other usage but sugar production.
Following the implementation of this policy, most local middle
and small size sugar factories were forced into bankruptcy.
Monopoly capital in sugar production began to exploit the peasants'
surplus products by suppressing the sales price. At the same time,
the sugar factories set up a usury under the name of "cultivation
loan" for the poor peasants, as part of the prepayment for the
crops. Actually, most peasants borrowed from this usury for
their living expenses, and their debts increased rapidly, finally
to become unrepayable. Usually, the peasants should have the
right to change their cultivation if the selling price of sugar
cane was too low. But the usury debts and natural soil condition
gave the peasants little choice, no matter what kind of price the
sugar factories offered. During that period, most sugar cane
peasants became "slaves of debts".
After World War I, the commercialization of rice and potatoes
made the management of the sugar production companies very diffi-
cult. The peasants' attitude towards cultivating sugar cane
became more and more negative. Under these circumstances the
sugar production companies began to increase their land ownership
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through the assistance of colonial government. But large-scale
capitalist cultivation of sugar cane on company owned land has
not yet appeared. The companies usually rented the land to
tenants to cultivate, in the manner of local feudalistic landlords.
The major reason for this is that the profit of large-scale
capitalist cultivation was much less than that under the feudal-
ist relations of production in Taiwan's rural society at that
time. According to the lease between the companies and the tenants,
the companies had priority to buy the tenants' products, the
right to supervise the tenants' cultivation, to ask the tenants
to offer their extra labor, and to limit the tenants' by-products
etc. The tenants under this exploitative relationship were no
longer free agricultural workers.
During this period, Taiwan's peasants existed in extreme
poverty. According to the investigation of economic condition by
the Department of Agriculture in the colonial government in 1928,
the average annual income of the rice tenant was 570 yuan, while
the average annual expenses was 695 yuan. The annual average
income for the sugar cane tenant was 1,056 yuan, while expenses
werel,081 yuan. This fact shows that the landlords and monopoly
companies absorbed not only the peasants' surplus products, but
their wages as well.
b. Development of Capitalism and Industry
The development of capitalism and industry before 1931 can
be divided basically into three periods, according to the nature
of development and the implementation of development policies.
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The first period is from 1895 ( the year of Japanese occupancy
of Taiwan ) to 1914 ( the breaking out of World War I ). The
second period is the period of World War I ( 1914 - 1920 ) and
the third is that between 1920 - 1930 ( 1930 is the year of
Japanese invasion of China ).
(i) The Development of The First Period ( 1895 - 1914 )
The bases for the development of Taiwan's capitalization
were the implementation of land investigation and the unification
of the currency system. The surveying and mapping of land began
in 1898. With the result of the survey the colonial government
rearranged and simplified the relationship of land ownership to
three basic classes -- the big landlord, the middle landlords and
the tenants, in order to make it more convenient for the Japanese
capitalists to acquire the development land. In 1910, the colonial
government started the land survey of Taiwan. According to the
regulations of this survey, all of Taiwan's land would belong to
the government except those which had clear evidence of land
ownership. As a result of the survey, there were 916,775 chas'
land belonging to the colonial government. Privately owned land
were only 6,961 chas. Most of the government-owned land was then
transferred into the hands of Japanese monopoly capitalists.
These policies helped the successful capital accumulation of
Japanese capitalists. Accordingly, a lot of the local middle and
small landlords and peasants also lost their means of production.
Within the currency market of the semi-feudalistic society
of Taiwan, there were hundreds of different kinds of currencies.
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Uniformity of the currency system between Japan and Taiwan was
very important for the convenience of the product exchange and
the capital transfer. In 1898, Japan began to implement the
currency system of the gold standard. In 1903, Taiwan followed
and eight years later ( 1911 ) Taiwan's currency system was com-
pletely united with that of Japan's.
Before the Japanese occupancy, trade in Taiwan was controlled
by foreign capitalist. In 1895, after the expulsion both of
foreign trade and foreign financial potential, complete Japanese
control of capital became a necessity in colonial Taiwan. Through
the assistance of the colonial government, Japanese capital
succeeded in forcing other potential foreign capital to completely
withdraw from Taiwan in 1907.
Within the initial period of Japanese occupancy, Taiwan's
finance was dependent on subsidies from Japanese national coffers.
For example, in 1896, the subsidy reached 6,940,000 yuan as com-
pared to the total income of the colonial government of 9,650,000
yuan. In 1897, the subsidy was 5,690,000 yuan out of the total
income of 11,280,000 yuan. In 1904 war between Japan and Russia
broke out. The large amount of military expenses forced the
Japanese government to stop the Taiwan subsidy. Thus, the colonial
government was forced to become financially independent. The source
for this independence came mainly from the incomes of the newly
established monopoly enterprises of the colonial government. For
example, out of the annual income of 21,700,000 yuan of the
colonial government in 1905, 4,200,000 yuan came from the opium
monopoly.
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The capitalization of Taiwan's sugar production started with
the establishment of the Taiwan Sugar Production Company in 1897.
Total capital for the company was one million yuan, of which the
largest share belonged to Mitsui financial tycoon. Within the
period between 1904 and 1910, seven big sugar production enter-
prises were established. Two of them belonged to the national
comprador capital. The development of capitalist enterprises
usually entails the decline of family industries and manual
trade factories; this decline in Taiwan was further enforced by
the colonial government. After 1910, the old style and small
agar production factories disappeared and the market of sugar
production was completely controlled by the modern enterprises.
(ii) Development of The Second Period ( 1914 - 1920 )
The period of World War I was the "golden age" for the
development of Japanese capitalism. All the other competitors
withdrew from the Far Eastern and the whole Pacific area came
under Japanese influence. Profits from trade monopolized by the
Japanese capitalists were incredible. During this period, sugar
production industry and other industries in colonial Taiwan also
developed very rapidly. The capital for the development of Taiwan's
industrial enterprises increased from 60,000,000 yuan to
200,000,000 yuan. The number of factories increased from 1,300
to 2,600 and the number of workers increased from 22,000 to
48,000. The total income of industrial production increased from
50,000,000 yuan to 190,000,000 yuan.
The newly emerging industries included that of textile,
metal processing, mechanical equipment, chemical production, and
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pottery. The increasing rate for the production income was 15
times for the textile industry, 4 times for the pottery industry,
and 7 times for the chemical production industries. Within this
period, the concentration of production and the accumulation of
capital made new progress. The profit for Japanese monopoly capital
was incredibly high.
Under this situation, the next step for large-scale develop-
ment in Taiwan was to emphasize industrialization. The plan for
the construction of hydroelectric power plant on Sun-Moon Lake
was initiated. The colonial governor established the Taiwan
Electric Power Company for the implementation of the electric
power plant in Sun-Moon Lake. -This was one of the most important
monopoly enterprises of the colonial government.
(iii) Development of The Third Period ( 1920 - 1930 )
The beginning of the economic crisis in 1920 shook
the whole public economic system in Japan. The so-called "goden
age" had ended. Since then, Japanese capitalism fell into long
term economic recession. Within this period, Japan suffered from
four serious crises. The first one was the after-war crisis
between 1920 and 1921. The second crisis combined with the
agricultural one which occurred in 1923. The third began with
the financial crisis and finanally influenced every department
of the public economic system in 1927, and the last one was from
the worldwide economic crisis in 1929.
Although the influence of the above economic crises was also
very serious in colonial Taiwan, assistance from the colonial
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government to the monopoly capitalists was increased in order to
transfer the effect of the crisis to the people and protect
Japanese monopoly profit. Within this period, the export of
Japanese domestic capital to colonial Taiwan increased more
rapidly than ever. Sugar production was the most important monopoly
enterprise at that time. According to the statistics of the colo-
nial government in 1926, the total amount of capital for the
companies and enterprises in Taiwan was 560,000,000 yuan. Total
Japanese investment reached 1,300,000,000 yuan at the end of 1926.
Total cultivated land was 800,000 chas, within which 7,805,000
chas' land were controlled as the cultivation region of the
sugar production companies. Taiwan's total income of export in
1926 was 250,000,000 yuan, within which the export income for
sugar was 100,000,000 yuan, 98% of which belonged to the modern
sugar production companies. After the crisis in 1927, Taiwan's
sugar production business became entirely controlled by several
monopoly financial tycoons. These included Mitsui, Mitsubushi and
Fujiyama etc. At this time, the only two modern sugar production
companies controlled by comprador capital ( the Lin Yun Yuang,
and the Sin Kaw sugar production company ) had been annexed by
them. Cartel aggreements had been made among these several
konzerns in order to maintain the monopoly prices and profits.
Trading relations between Taiwan and Japan were another
important characteristic of Taiwan's colonial development. Before
1895, trade between Taiwan and Japan was very limited. Until 1897,
Taiwan's income from trade with Japan only occupied 19% of the
total trading income. But in 1931, it increased to 86% of Taiwan's
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total trading income ( Table 1-5 ). The content of the colonial
Taiwan's export to Japan emphasized rice and sugar ( Table 1-6 ).
For example, in 1931, the income of rice and sugar for Taiwan's
export to Japan was 80% of the total income. Other foods like
bananas, tea, honey, salt, dry fish and canned fruit occupied
7.2%, and other materials like minerals, alcohol, timber of
Juniper, and camphor etc occupied 8.5%. All the income of these
eighteen kinds of merchandises occupied 94.9% of the total export
income. The items of Taiwan's import from Japan had much more
varieties than that of export ( Table 1-7 ). For example, in
1931, the cost of imported food from Japan occupied 25.2% of the
total cost of import from Japan ( this ratio decreased to 21.9%
in 1935 ); the cost of imported items like automobile, bicycles.
and mechanical equipment occupied 17.5% of the total cost of
import from Japan; the cotton textile and fiber production 17.5%;
the sulphuret and other fertilizers and timbers 15% ( this ratio
increased to 20.9% in 1935 ) and the chemical industrial produc-
tion 9.6%.
The trading relation between Taiwan and Japan illustrated
the typical characteristics of the colonial trade. (1) Taiwan's
export merchandises to Japan was almost entirely agricultural
products and processing products. For instance, the income of
exporting rice and sugar occupied 80% of the total income of
export; and the production of these two items was completely
under the control of Japanese monopoly capital. (2) The import
of Japanese industrial products occupied an absolutely high per-
centage of the total import products. Through the process of
different price exchange of agricultural products and industrial
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productions, Japanese capitalists exploitedthe people of the
colonial Taiwan as much as they could.
c. The Social Change
During the process of Taiwan's capitalization for this
period, class differentiation occurred in the society. Taiwan's
capitalization did not develop from the forces inherent in its
own society, but because of the intrusion of Japanese monopoly
capital. Therefore, the social forces of production and relations
of production which developed also indicated the typical charac-
teristics of a colonized society.
The upper class of Taiwan's society was mainly composed of
Japanese capitalists. Most of them lived comfortably in domestic
Japan and enjoyed the monopoly profit of colonial enterprises.
For instance, 90% of the share of the Imperial Sugar Production
Company belonged to the Japanese living in Japan; 3% belonged to
the Japanese living in Taiwan, and the rest 7% belonged to the
Taiwanese. The situation for other enterprises were almost the
same. The minority of Japanese who lived in Taiwan included the
employees of the monopoly financial tycoons, and the bureaucrats.
Because of the imperialistic policies and Japanese monopoly
capital, Taiwan's national capital had no way to develop inde-
pendently. Most of the national capital invested in Japanese
enterprises, depended completely on the development of Japanese
capital. A small part of national capital was invested in the
export and import trading business and served the Japanese
monopoly capitalists. This was the comprador nature of Taiwan's
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national capitalists. Most of the time, national capital was also
invested on land cultivation and became the capital of feudalistic
landlords. This indicated the feudalistic nature of national
capitalists. These emerging comprador classes stood with the
Japanese financial tycoon on the top of the pyramid of Taiwan's
society, exploiting the majority of the Taiwanese.
The emerging working class in Taiwan was the other new
social class arising from the development of industries. The
exploited situation of the Japanese workers was "typically colonial".
But the Taiwan's workers were under much worse condition. Not
only were their wages lower than Japanese workers ( Table 1-8 )
but there were close to no welfare or any workers' protection.
They were the emerging urban proletarian in the society within
the development of industry and capitalism.
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D. Development Within The Colonial Period II 1930-1945
The onset of the world-wide economic crisis in 1929
severely damaged the Japanese economy. The combination of agri-
cultural and industrial crisis for the capitalist economy
expressed itself much sharper in Japan because of the existing
semi-feudalistic social relation -in rural areas. At the end of
1929, many middle and small banks were bankrupt. Within the
period of 1930-1931, around ten thousand middle and small
enterprises folded, causing widespread unemployment ( three
million unemployed ). But the real crisis was in agriculture.
The price of rice dropped over 50%, and the price of silk dropped
70%. The plight of the Japanese peasant became harder than ever.
The tenant was unable to pay the rent. The agricultural crisis
caused landlords and rich peasants to realized that the adverse
effects of the economic crisis was much greater for them than for
the capitalists and this led to extreme dissatisfaction. This
dissatisfaction was manifested in the fascist group in the
Japanese imperialist government, as the so-called "stalwart"
group. They demanded the elimination of libralism in the
government, declared the coercive foreign policies and promoted
the invasion of China in order to release the contradictions
within Japanese imperialism. Japan invaded the northeastern part
of China in Sept. 18, 1931. Following this new military adventure,
the Japanese economic system was transformed to a war-time economy.
The economic system of colonial Taiwan followed likewise in the
footstep of this change.
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a. The Development of Agriculture
As mentioned earlier, after World War I, the increasing
consumption of food encouraged Taiwan's production of the so-
called "pon-lai rice". Since 1923, Taiwan's export of rice had
increased each year. In 1930, the agricultural crisis in Japan
depressed prices on agricultural products. The Japanese govern-
ment established legislation for the control of rice and crops
in 1933 in order to arrest the continuing drop of price of rice
and to protect the profits of the landlord and the rich peasant.
This legislation failed to reverse the decline of the price of
rice. Therefore, new legislation for import control and restric-
tion of rice and crops was announced in 1934 in order to transfer
the damage of crisis to the colonial peasants. After the Japanese
restriction of imported rice and crops, Taiwan's agricultural
production shifted to emphasize cotton, hemp , flax, ramien,
sweet potato, wheat and peanuts. All of these were significant
products for establishing a self-sufficient export trading
economy to support the Japanese military invasion of China.
During the development of the economic crisis, the accumu-
lation of capital and the concentration of production in Taiwan
continued to take place. In 1932, the central control union for
sugar production was established. This was the cartel cooperation
of the sugar production enterprices. Following this, the Shin-Chu
and the So-Lu sugar production companies combined with the Sau-
Hou sugar production company in October 1933; The Sin-Gau sugar
production company merged with the Great-Japan Sugar Production
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Company in December 1934.
In July 7, 1937, Japanese imperialists started large scale
military invasion of China, and China declared war against Japan.
The Sino-Japanese War was formally declared and lasted 8 years.
World War II also broke out in 1939, and as a consequence, the
public sector of Japanese economic structure was mobilized for
the war. In Taiwan, the "Five Year Plan For The Expansion of
Productive Forces" was implemented in 1938. This plan focused on
the promotion of capital accumulation, the concentration of
production and the enforcement of economic control. The agricul-
tural development aspect of this plan emphasized both the encour-
agement of production of rice and crops and the control of the
price of agricultural products. The legislation for the produc-
tion control of rice and crops and the price control of agricul-'
tural products was established in 1939. Therefore, the income of
Taiwan's peasants decreased significantly. The peasant livelihood
became harder and harder, and poverty in the rural area became
deeper than ever. For the continuing capital accumulation and
the centralization of sugar production, the Great Japan Sugar
Production Company combined within the Imperial Sugar Production
Company in 1940 through the assistance of the colonial governor.
Moreover, the colonial government began to mobilize Taiwan's
manpower to participated in the war of invasion. Large numbers
of young Taiwanese were drafted from the rural areas to Shunhai
and Nanking for Japanese military service.
On December 8th, 1941, Japanese imperialists attacked Pearl
Harbor and declared war against the United States and Britain.
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Taiwan became Japan's base in the South Pacific. More and more
young Taiwanese were drafted by force for military service or
into the labor force in the war.
The new agricultural development plan of the so-called "Ten
Year Plan for Increasing Production of Rice and Crops" was set up
in 1943. But the food shortage problem became more and more acute.
This was mainly due to the enforcement of economic control. En-
forced buying and the price control of agricultural products in
the new plan were equivalent to outright plunder. Moreover, the
shortage of labor and fertilizer became increasingly serious in
the large-scale rural areas. The last years of the colonial
period witnessed the agricultural sector facing imminent bank-
ruptcy with the majority of the peasants poorer than ever,
struggling for survival on the edge of starvation.
b. Development of Industry
The industrial development for this period started with the
construction of the hydroelectric power plant in Sun-Moon Lake
in 1931, which was finished in 1934. This was very important for
Taiwan's industrialization process. A sufficient supply of cheap
power was the most important factor for the establishment of heavy
industry and chemical industry. The emerging industries in the
initial development process included that of light metal, manu-
facturing, metal production, mechinary manufacturing, petrolem
and natural gas, sulphates production, alcohol and oil production
etc. All of these industries were mainly for establishing the
basis for military supply industries and vital self-sufficient
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materials.
Within this period, with the assistances from the colonial
institute, a new monopoly enterprise -- the Taiwan Development
Company was established in 1936. The total capital for this
company was thirty million yuan. Half of this sum belonged to the
colonial government and it was paid for by the supply of public
land in Taiwan. The other half share belonged to the financial
tycoons of the Japanese Sugar Production Company, Mitsui and
Mitsubishi etc. The range of Business of the development company
was very broad including land developmenting, land cultivation,
plantation, oil production, chemical industry, timber industry,
mining, investment, usury and investigation etc. The company also
owned a large amount of branches which was spread all over Taiwan,
South China, and the South Pacific areas. Through the large-scale
assistance of the colonial government, this company controlled
Taiwan's economic development since 1938.
The major emphasis of the so-called "Five Year Plan for The
Expansion of The Productive Force" established in 1938 was on
industrial development. The major objects of the expansion of
the productive force included the dulphates, the aluminum produc-
tion, sisal hemp, ramie cloth, paper manufacturing, and machinary
manufacturing. While some of these were new industries, the
objective for existing industries was to expand the scale of
production at least two or three times. Development of mining
was also included in this plan. Mining included gold, copper,
coal, petroleum, sulfur, metal and manganese. Generally speaking,
the emphasis of industrialization in this plan focused on the
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establishment of military supply industries in order to prepare
for the larger scale war of invasion.
After 1943-the last year of the five year plan, the develop-
ment of industry still emphasized the military supply industries,
such as metal production, chemical and machinary manufacturing.
Some of the so-called "self-sufficient" light industries declined,
such-as that of textile and paper production. The major reasons
for the decline were the continuing inflation, rapid increase of
the market price, the shortage of capital and labor force, and
the antiquity of the equipment. Moreover, the naval blockade by
the Allied nations became tighter and tighter and the bombing of
the Allies' air force became increasingly fierce. Within the last
several years, most of the productive activities in the industrial
sector were forced to a stop. But inflation, the shortage of
materials and the rise in market price did not stop. The unemploy-
ment rate rose to an incredible height. Taiwan's economic struc-
ture was on the brink of total bankruptcy
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Foot Notes:
1. All the development history and reference material for
the above contents are extracted from the following articles:
T.C. Pen, "Taiwan's Social Economy" in The Book of Taiwan
Quarterly; Vol.1, No.1; Taipei; Taiwan Press; 1947
Tadao Yanaihara, Japanese Imperialism In Taiwan ed. by
M.Y. Chen; Taipei, (Taiwan Province Documents Committee);
1952
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E. The Urbanization and The Distribution of The Towns and The Cities
a. The Essence of The Town
Most of the small urban areas -- the so-called "local towns"
were formed before the colonial period, and all of these local
towns maintained very strong Chinese characteristics. According
to the origin and development of these towns, they can be divided
into two styles: the rural towns and the port towns.
Usually, appearance of the rural town is associated with
land cultivation. Following the openning up of agricultural land,
villages began to form around the farms. Among the villages, the
small rural town, composed of a few streets and several small
stores and shops, developed at the appropriate locality. The
initial development of these towns was parallel to that of the
surrounding villages and completely depended on the development
of the villages. Small handicraft industries and retail businesses
also developed according to the conditions of surrounding villages.
If the harvest of the surrounding villages was very plentiful for
a certain season, the development of the town became vital. Most
of the original residents of these towns were small merchants
and landlords; sometimes the landlords of the surrounding villages
also ran the businesses and local industries in these towns.
Following the expansion of the surrounding villages, the rural
towns developed their own administrative, cultural, financial
systems; control of the administrative and financial system fell
into the hands of several big landlords and rich merchants. After
the minority group of landlords and merchants gained control of
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the town, they began to develop and expand the local industries
and business in order to meet the demand of the market outside
of the surrounding villages. At the same time, they also controlled
the trading business aroung the surrounding villages in order to
monopolize the materials and the means of production. This minority
group transferred into the original comprador class after the
foreign power seized Taiwan. At this stage, the development of
the rural towns became the dominant force over the surrounding
villages. But production relations in large rural areas still
remained the same -- the feudalistic relation of production.
Therefore, most of the industries in the rural towns still remained
at the stage of handicraft production, and most of the business
companies were family style. The early stages of local industries
and the sugar production were very good examples of these.
The earliest development of towns in Taiwan took the form of
port towns. During the early stage of Taiwan's development,
numerous harbors arose along the west coast of Taiwan. These har-
bors formed the first stops and initial bases for the mainland
immigrants. Most of the harbors were spread over the mouth of the
rivers along the coast. At that time, land development had just
started and land transport was very unconvenient. River transport
became the easiest way for further settlement of inland areas.
A series of port towns began to appear along each bank from down-
stream to upstream for inland cultivation. Rural villages then
appeared in the surrounding areas of these port towns. All the
supplies for land cultivation were transported from mainland
China through these port towns to the villages, while the pro-
ducts of the villages were transported to the mainland and other
-37-
towns through the port towns. Following the development of the
surrounding villages, trading businesses, handicraft industries
and agricultural processing industries in the port town also
expanded. Of course, the harbors at the mouth of the rivers also
grew very fast, some of which developed into the scale of cities.
Generally speaking, the last fifty year of the nineteenth century
formed a booming period for the development of port towns. The
businesses and local industries of port towns were usually
monopolized by the bureaucrats of the Ching dynasty and the com-
prador class in the early stages of development. Member of the
ruling class plundered the agricultural land of the surrounding
villages through the assistance of the Ching government and became
the big landlords. The basic feudalistic relation of production
in Taiwan became established at this time. The development of
port towns along the Tansui river was a very good example. ( Tan-
sui river is an important river in northern Taiwan, passing
directly through the Taipei metropolitan area -- the capital and
the largest urban area in Taiwan )
Tashie was the harbor at the mouth of the Tansui river.
Through the transportation of river boats, the port towns of
Sanshai, Shinchuan, Panchao, Moncha, Tataochun and Tansui arose
along the Tansui river. Through these port towns, the local
villages could trade with mainland China. During the latter 1700's
large boats could arrive directly at Shinchuan. All the goods and
supplies were then transported to other port towns from Shinchuan
by small river boats. Therefore, Shinchuan became the fastest
growing town along the river. The period of 1862-1894 was the
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"golden age" for the development of Shinchuan. At least 200-300
boats stopped by the port each day. The whole port town of Shin-
chuan was completely under the control of the business company of
Lin Yung-Yuan family. The ancester of Lin's family was the
imperial inspector general of the Ching dynasty in Taiwan. He
built a large and luxurious mansion for his family in the center
of town, and then constructed the whole commercial district and
the streets of the town and rented the stores to other merchants.
At the same time, he also owned the land in the town and in the
surrounding villages. During the late nineteenth century, Lin's
family moved to Panchao and built a new residence there. There
were more than a hundred people living in their new dwelling,
including dozens of servants and slaves. This huge mansion has
been kept as a historical and tourist site in Panchao city today.
During the late nineteenth century, there were only two
rural towns and port towns which developed into the scale of a
city - Taipei and Tainan, because of their suitable locality for
administrative, commercial and cultural functions.
b. The Change of The Local Town
After the Japanese occupancy, the opening up of land took
place much faster than before due to the encouragement of the
colonial government. Some new towns arose in this period of rapid
development. At the same time, some of the old towns declined,
especially the port town. The most influential elements in the
growth or decline of the local towns were the constructions of
the transportation system and the influence of industrialization.
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For example, after the construction of the North-South railroad
system in 1902, new towns emerging as transportation centers
included Chunan, Foonyuang, Yuanglin, and Pintung etc. The rapid
expansion of the sugar production industry around 1910 was also
a major reason for the emerging of new towns. The new local
centers emerging from the sugar production industry during this
period were Huwei, Pulee, Nantou, Yunglin, Sheelou, Chalee, Pintung,
Tantze, and Shaukung etc. All the towns along the eastern coast
of Taiwan emerged after the Japanese occupation. The rapid opening
up of land and development destroyed a lot of woodland and forests
on the mountain sides along the upstream of the rivers. This
resulted in constant flodding. Often times the flood changed the
course of the river and carried large amounts of sediment from
the mountain. The sediment usually precipitated in the river bed
at the downstream of the river. This made the river lose its
transportation function. The port towns along the river thus
declined naturally, since there was no other land transportation
system to act as substitute for that of the river. At the same
time, the new development of steamship transportation required
deep water harbors. Most of the old harbors built for marine
transportation were unable to anchor the new ships. Also, soil
conditions around the harbor were usually too poor for agricul-
tural cultivation and settlement. Therefore, a lot of the old
harbors lost their functions and declined during the early
twentieth century, while new harbors emerged. Today's two largest
deep sea harbors -- Kaoshung and Keelung, were constructed during
that period.
-40-
Reconstruction of existing towns took place during the
beginning of the colonial period according to a town-renewal plan.
The major intention of this plan was to eliminate the original
Chinese characteristics of the town in order to recreate the
town in Japanese style. The reconstruction of town also had diff-
erent styles according to the different periods of reconstruction.
For example, the towns reconstructed during the initial period of
Japanese occupancy belonged to the so-called "Meiji style". The
"Taisho style" was for the middle period ( around 1920-30 ). For
the late period ( 1935-1940 ) the reconstruction of town emphasized
the style of Showa. After the publication of the Legislation of
Urban Planning in Taiwan in August 1936, islandwide town recons-
truction began. The emphasis of this reconstruction project was
on the widening of the streets and roads, the constructing of the
sewer system and new business district, and replanning of urban
blocks etc. Following these, the reconstruction of urban housing
was promoted. By the end of 1930, the original Chinese charac-
teristics of most towns were almost completely wiped out, and
the new urban Japanese Style was established. Today the basic
urban planning system was inherited from this original system and
retains heavy Japanese influence.
c. The Distribution of The Towns and The Cities
As mentioned before, during the early stage, local towns
arose among large rural areas and developed according to the
evolution of the feudalistic society. The local towns retained
very close relationships with the surrounding villages even
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within the semi-colonial and semi-feudalistic period. Therefore,
the distribution of the towns was quite even and the growth of
towns was slow. The situation changed after the Japanese occupa-
tion. First of all, land ownership was reformed by the colonial
government. Most of the land in Taiwan fell into the hands of
Japanese capitalists and the colonial government. The all-
important sugar production industry was taken over by the
Japanese capitalists. A new and rapid transportation system --
the North-South railroad was constructed by the colonial govern-
ment. At the beginning of the twentieth century, the means of
production and transportation were under Japanese control. Large
amounts of Japanese capital went into local sugar production. At
the same time, most of the Taiwanese peasants lost their means
and materials of production because of the land accumualtion and
the primitive capital accumulation policies of Japanese imper-
ialism. Some of the peasants migrated to the local towns and
became part of the urban proletariat and the colonial industrial
development process. Within this process, some local sugar
production towns grew very fast, and new industrial towns and
transportation centers also arose. The form of productive force
and production relations in the urban areas began to be separated
from the surrounding countryside and developed from one of feu-
dalism to that of colonial capitalism. The development policies
of the colonial government emphasized localized development of
the urban area without linkages to the surrounding villages in
order to increase capital accumulation for the Japanese capitalist.
The transformation of urban production relations and localization
development policies promoted uneven growth and distribution of
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the urban areas. Large cities grew faster than small cities, and
industrial towns developed faster than the rural towns. Several
large cities developed their own localized social modes of
production and trading system, completely separated from the
surrounding countryside, such as Taipei, Taichung, Tainan and
Kauchung etc.
After the establishment of the "Five-Year Plan for The
Expansion of The Productive Force" in 1938, the so-called
"industrialization of Taiwan" became the major emphasis of
development. Most of the emerging "self-sufficient" and military
supply industries were concentrated around several large cities
for convenient transportation of supplies and products. At the
same time, the exploitative nature of Japanese imperialists in
rural area became increasingly pronounced, and the livelihood of
the majority of Taiwanese peasants became worse than ever. The
flow of the labor force from countryside to large cities then
increased rapidly. All of these caused the uneven distribution
of the cities and abnormal growth of large cities.
According to the statistics of the colonial government
there were only 17 local towns and cities in 1900 ( the early
period of Japanese occupation ), and total urban population was
235,000, which was about 8.32% of the total population. In 1940
( the latter period of Japanese occupation),the number of the
towns and cities increased to 61, and the urban population
increased to 1,271,000, which was 20.6% of the total population
of Taiwan. During this period, the population of Keelung city
increased ten times, the population of Taipei, Chayee, and Tainan
cities increased five times, and the population of six cities
including Shenchu, Chaunhau, Peikaung, Putze, Foonsan, and Tunkaung
doubled. The city of Kaushung presented the most dramatic growth
during the period of Japanese occupation. During the early 1900's,
Kaushung was still a small port town with population around 5,000.
But during the latter period of Japanese occupancy - 1940, it
grew 50 times and became the second largest city in Taiwan, with
a population of arround 250,000.
d. The Function of The Town and The Cities
The function of the towns and cities before the colonial
period was to be the commercial, cultural and trading centers
for the rural areas. Some small-scale handicraft industries also
developed. Most of the towns and cities maintained strong rural
characteristics due to their close relationship with the surroun-
ding villages. These circumstances began to change after the
Japanese occupation. The encroachment of Japanese capital took
over control of important industries. The major commercial and
trading businesses became concentrated in the hands of the emer-
ging comprador class and served the imperialist interest. Existing
Chinese schools were forced to close down and all Chinese cultural
activities were prohibited in order to eliminate any nationalistic
sentiments. New Japanese-style schools were built for Japanese
children and the children of the privileged comprador class. 98%
of the population was illiterate. There were few bookstores in
the towns and the cities. The public library only existed in large
cities, and usually was under the control of the city government.
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Most of the emerging industrial and mining towns were cultural
deserts. All the cultural policies of the colonial government
were meant to keep the Taiwanese in ignorance. Entertainment
facilities were also poor. Except for the largest cities, there
were very few parks or public recreational spaces in urban areas
for the residents. The only urban activity encouraged by the
colonial government was that of religion. Therefore, temples
usually appeared in the center of the town. The district around
the temples was always the most lively area of the town, and all
the urban activities took place there, especially during the
period of temple festivities. This situation still remains the
same today in some declining small towns. The major function of
the towns and cities within the colonial period was to serve as
imperialist centers for accumulating and exploiting the resources.
products and labor force of agriculture, mining and industries
in Taiwan. All the physical construction of urban development was
then set up to serve this function.
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F. The Housing Development
Before the colonial period, the pattern of Taiwan's housing
developed basically from the village settlement of the traditional
Chinese atrium house. Even the town house followed the same style.
Most of the residents of the village were peasants. Their houses
were constructed with unburnt bricks and only had one courtyard,
except for the large family. As mentioned before, the residents
of the local towns or cities consisted mostly of landlords,
merchants, government vureaucrats and officials, and owners of
local handicraft factories. Because they were richer than the
peasants, townhouses were usually larger than the village houses
and built with bricks and tiles. Some large atrium houses consisted
of three or four courtyards. Some western-style houses with two
or three floors also appeared in the cities. Shops, stores and
factories always occupied the front row or the first flooe of
the houses and faced the street, and the owner's families lived
in the back courtyards or the second floors within the business
district of towns and cities. This combination of dwellings and
stores presented the typical urban life style of the merchants
or the business owners in the feudalistic Chinese society.
By 1895, after the Japanese occupation, a large number of
luxurious Japanese style residences were constructed in the cities
and industrial towns for the new upper strata -- Japanese bureau-
crats, military personnel and capitalists. The widening and
reconstructing the street and blocks in cities and towns began
after the publication of Taiwan's "Housing and Building Construc-
tion Code" in 1899. Most of the traditional town houses were
destroyed under this code. New business districts following the
so-called "Meiji Style" were erected in cities and local towns..
Following the stages of colonial development, local family-style
industries and factories gradually underwent bankruptcy, while
the industries and factories of Japanese capitalists were being
established rapidly in cities and towns. At ths same time, a new
proletariat class was arising in the urban areas and increasing
very rapidly. They built their own houses with unburnt bricks,
bamboo strips and straws around the area near the factories. With
the erection of living quarters for workers, there could no longer
be any uniform housing style. Usually these houses consisted of
only one room for the whole family. According to the statistics
of the colonial government in 1939, 98% of the urban population
lived in this kind of housing. During the latter period of
Japanese occupation, most of these houses were destroyed by the
continued bombing of the Allied air force.
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Foot Notes:
1. All the urban development history and reference materials
for the above section are extracted from the articles:
Lee T.L. "The Formation And Development of Taiwan's Cities"
in The Bank of Taiwan Quarterly, Vol.24, No.3; Taipei:
Taiwan Press. 1968
Lin T.Y. "Urban And Regional Planning In Taiwan" in The
Bank of Taiwan Quarterly, Vol.24, No.3; Taipei: Taiwan
Press. 1968
Chu P.I. "The Development of Taiwan's Urban Housing Cons-
truction" in The Bank of Taiwan Quarterly, Vol.24, No.3;
Taipei: Taiwan Press. 1968.
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A. Introduction: A Theory of Urban and Regional Development
and Housing Development
After 1949, the Nationalist government retreated from
mainland China to Taiwan. The government realized that the
result of major failure of development policies during the
last period of anti-communist struggle (1947-1949). Therefore,
the emphasis of Taiwan's development should be on the economic
recovery. Taiwan's social, financial, economic and political
crises also came to a head during the late 4 0's because of
the destruction of World War II, and the influence of long-
term civil war in mainland China after the recovery. U.S. aid
in every aspect became the most important support for the
government's plan of recovery. Under U.S. aid, numerous
American experts were sent to every department of the central
government and provincial government to assist in the future
development plan. Moreover, the first period development plan
after Taiwan's recovery (1945-1952) was entirely initiated by
the American Watt Consultant Company with the support of U.S.
foundation funding. Therefore, Taiwan's development model was
established upon a theory of regional development based upon
the western capitalist system from the very beginning. Before
discussing Taiwan's development after 1949, it is necessary to
review the basic development theory of western capitalist
economics within recent years.
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a. Basic Assumptions
The mainstream of the western capitalist development theory
was developed according to what may be termed "equilibrium
theory." This theory has certain basic assumptions behind it,
which are:
(1) The existing relations between the different social groups
and classes were established on the basis of harmony and mutual
benefit. If there exists any contradictions, they should be
compromised.
(2) The existing relations between the social groups or classes
were developed under common ideals. Therefore, social, economic
and political structures and institutions should reflect these
ideals.
(3) The problem of uneven distribution in society always exists
it is an unavoidable phenomenon. Government's efforts reduced
the gap of uneven distribution, but do not eliminate it forever.
(4) Individualism should be advoated and developed to the
fullest extent.
(5) The government should be unbiased arbitrator among the
conflicts of interests of different social classes.
(6) Capitalism is the product of humanity.
(7) Human nature is defective, societal institutions exist to
restrict the manifestation of human defects.1
Following the development of "Equilibrium Theory", a
series of detailed theories on each aspects of the capitalist
system developed. Within this series, two major theories
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directly influenced the modern development of most developing
countries. One is the "Theory of Development Stages" represented
by W.W. Rostow. It emphasized market, capital, resources and
growth. The other is the "Development Dualism" developed by
A.O. Hirschman, H.G. Barnett, E.M. Rogers, B. Hoselitz, and
M. Levy. It emphasized the development relationships of different
economic sectors and technological development. The following
discussion concerns mainly these two major theories.;2
b. Capital, Market, Resources, Techniques and Labor Force
There are several important factors concerned directly
with the development of western Capitalism in the so-called
Equlibrium Theory. These factors have been categorized into a
series of basic preconditions of development theory by western
economists. These preconditions became the fundamental guide-
lines on which most of the developing countries had followed
since early 50's. These are the concepts of market, capital,
resources, techniques and labor force.
Market:
According to the theory, markets have existed since the
beginning of barter trade. The completion of market systems and
functions should be within the period of capitalism. The market
should be a perfect and natural medium for adjusting the forces
of demand and supply within any society. Any restrictions on
market operation coming from external sources will confine the
natural functions of the market. Therefore, capitalist economists
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declared that the market should be separated from any other
social or political institutions and develop its own completely
free-trading system and self-adjusting nature. A totally func-
tional market system should be internationalized, although
each country could have her own complete submarket system.
Capital is the key initial moving force behind the operation
of market. The Capital market operates in each sub-market system
according to the unequal fluctuating forces of demand and
supply; i.e., capital flows into that sector of the market
where demand exceeds supply and profits are high. In this
manner, the capital market is the major controlling force of
the total system.3
Capital:
Intensive capital is the most important factor for
development for developing countries, capital accumulation of
natural resources and development of processing and manufacturing
industries. The growth of manufacturing business can increase
the social accumulation of capital in order to stimulate the
operating of domestic market and economic system. Operation
of the market and economic system will bring the developing
society step-by-step through the stages of tradition, take-off,
maturity and finally the stage of high-level consumption which
is the ultimate goal for development.
Resources:
The development of resources in developing countries is
completely dependent on the operation of sufficient capital.
But for most developing countries, the capital market system is
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so poor that it cannot support highly productive development
of resources. Western economists then suggested that the indus-
trialized nations should extend their powerful capital markets
into the developing countries to support the development of
sources. And the developing countries should widen the scope
of their resources market to an international scale in order
to exchange the capital and advanced technology of industrialized
nations for their own nature resources.
Technology:
According to western development theory, advanced techno-
logy also forms an independent market within the industrialized
nations. In international trade, technology is associated with
the capital market for the exchange of the resources in developing
countries. Through the exchange, the developing countries could
gain the advanced technology for further industrialization and
development. An unequal exchange relationship exists between
the industrialized nations and the developing countries during
the initial period. But this situation of inequality can be
gradually reduced according to the stages of industrialization
in the developing countries. However, this exchange is beneficial
to the world progress.4
Labor Force:
Most developing countries, primarily in the agricultural
sector, there is an abundant labor force. However, the agricul-
tural labor force remains at a level of handicraft. According
to the theory of Dualism, this is a waste of natural resources
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for the developing countries. Through the import of foreign
capital and advanced technology, the forces of production can
be changed. During the process of change, large amounts of
surplus labor can be channeled into the industrial and indus-
trial and manufacturing sectors in order to promote industria-
lization. The low price of labor is the most advantageous
factor for industrialization. Great. inequality in income
distribution will exist during the initial period. Following
the stages of development, the market system will become more
fully operative, consumption will become greater and the labor
price will increase naturally. The gap in uneven income distri-
bution then can be reduced.
c. Agriculture and Industry
Western development theory treats agriculture and industry
mainly from a "dualistic" viewpoint. This theory advocated new
technology as the driving force of development, no matter
whether technology comes from domestic of foreign sources. The
appearance of new technology affects the equlibrium of society,
leading to dualistic development within different sectors. But
this temporary disequilibrium is reduced by the transferring
of the technology from the advanced to the underdeveloped part
of the economy over time, until finally the whole society
reaches another, more advanced level of equilibrium. Therefore,
this theory divides society, reqions and even nations into
two parts, such as the modern and the traditional, the developed
and the under-developed, the industrial and the agricultural,
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and the capital and non-capital, etc. From a dualistic viewpoint,
the the development of traditional society must depend on the
modern society; the development of under-developed region must
depend on the developed region, and the booming of the agricul-
tural sector must depend on the advanced development of indus-
trial sector.5
Most societies in the developing countries are traditional;
their productive forces are under-developed and their population
belonged in the agricultural sector. Dualism theorists argue
that the modernization of the developing countries must
necessarily start with the import of foreign capital and advanced
technology in the development of industry. The agricultural
sectors which contain most of the. population must therefore
support industrial development by supplying the industrial
sector continuously with a sufficient amount of cheap agricul-
tural products and labor force in order to accumulate capital
for further development. The prosperity of agricultural produc-
tion, therefore, is completely dependent on the rapid develop-
ment of industry. The "take-off" of industry can in turn lead
the agricultural sector into the stage of mechanization. At
the same time, the society of the developing countries supposedly
comes into the period of "modernization" of "industrialization."
d. Social Forces of Production
According to the "Theory of Dualism", developing countries
did not progress for the last several centuries. The social
forces of production remained at the stage of traditional
agricultural production and the production of family handicrafts,
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mainly because of the restrictions imposed by feudalistic
concepts of traditional society. The situation will remain
the same in the future, if there is no other stimulating
force from outside the society. The best way for developing
countries to release the social restrictions and promote the
progress of social forces of production is to import new
technology and capital from the industrialized world for
developing domestic natural resources and modern industries.
The development of intensive labor production of natural
resources and industries will attract the surplus labor force
from the traditional rural sectors into the urban and industrial
sector. This transformation will also help the mechanization of
agricultural production. During this process of transformation,
the national economy will begin to grow, accumulation of social
property will increase rapidly, social consumption will be
stimulated and the market operation also will become more and
more vital. At the same time, the export of the primitive
agricultural and industrial processing products can help the
accumulation of capital; the opening of international trade
can stimulate further development. This process of transformation
will change the structure of the social forces of production in
the developing countries. Following this process, growth and
industrialization of the urban sectors will appear first,
and through the transference of the new technology and concepts
from the urban area to rural areas, techniques of agricultural
production will be improved and finally reach the stage of
complete mechanization. At this stage, the whole society can
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release itself from the traditional social force of production
and step into the new period of modernization.
e. Urbanization And The Change of Social Structure
Western theorists believ that during the process of
industrialization or modernization, the uneven development
between the urban and the rural sector or the industrial and
agricultural sectors is the driving force of development. It
can be viewed as progress of the society. The new technology
and large amounts of capital coming into the urban and indus-
trial sectors stimulate changes in the productive force. This
change upsets the equilibrium of the traditional society; -
it can cause large-scale migration of population from rural
countryside to urban sectors. This is so-called urbanization.
Therefore, "urbanization" is an unavoidable phenomena during
the process of industrialization. Some theorists would even
consider urbanization to represent the progress of develop-
ment. Urbanization and industrialization will also change the
structure of traditional society. The urbanization process
and inter-migration causes the break-down of the feudalistic
relations of traditional society. A new social structure will
then be established on the basis of progressive development.
Hence, urbanization is also the process of transforming the
social structure. It is predictable that many social, political,
economic and environmental problems will appear in the society
during the process of transformation. Western theorists view
most of these problems as rising from the conflicts of interests
among different social groups. These conflicts can be compromised
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through the assistance of the unbiased arbitrators - govern-
ments and institutions at various levels, and with various
functions within the existing system, because of the basic
assumptions that the existing system is established on the
basis of common understanding and mutual benefit of major
social groups and classes. The basis assumption views govern-
ments and institutions as being organized beyond the system
by the social majority in order to compromise the conflicts
of different interest groups in the society.
During the first period of urbanization, the most evident
change in social structure is the rapid increase of the blue-
collar population and emerging minority groups of the bourgeois
and the so-called "middle income" classes in the urban area.
Most of the blue-collar population come from rural sectors
and earn their living by selling their manual labor to the
factories around the urban area. The blue-collar population
usually has a subsistence standard of living. Most of the
bourgeois in developing countries come from the traditional
landlord and beaureaucratic families of the feudalistic
society; they belong to a similar category with the foreign
investors who control most of the capital and means of produc-
tion for the development. The middle-income classes mainly
come from an educated background; they aid the bourgeoisis in
operation of businesses, managing the industries and developing
the new technology. According to the theory of "dualism", the
inequality in income distribution among the three classes
within the developing society would appear during the
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beginning of the development. But the gap can reduced following
the stages of development, as long as the three classes associate
together and struggle for the progress in the social forces of
production. Improvement of productive forces can promote
capital accumulation which also means the increasing of social
property. Some of these would be collected by the government
and public institutions for implementing wide-range social
welfare policies. These policies would benefit the majority of
the society and improve the general social living standard.
The improvement can stimulate the operating viatality of
market forces and promote the development of productive forces.
At the same time, the general raising of educational level for
the majority by improving government's compulsory education
system is also one of the most important welfare policies
during the period of development. The association between
improvement of educational policies and growth of consumption
market can promote the developing of advanced technology and
improvement of productive force. Finally, the transformation
of the industrial system from the stage of labor-intensive
production to that of capital and technique-intensive production
can achieved. During this period, the demand for primitive
unskilled labor will decrease and the demand for technical,
skilled labor increase. In terms of the social structure, the
majority of the blue-collar population will gradually be
transformed into the middle-income class. After the completion
of the industrialization of social production, the majority
of the developing society will be composed of the middle-
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income class. And the gap in income distribution among different
classes will be reduced to a minimum.
f. Housing Development
(i) The Basic Concept of Housing Development
Under the "Equilibrium Theory" system, it is believed that
within a developed society, housing development should be
subsidiary to an over all market system. In the manner of all
the other consumption markets, the housing market should operate
entirely according to the relations of supply and demand. For
a society within the process of industrialization, the process
for the housing development can be described as follow: The
residents' demand for housing can be divided into four stages
according to the development of living standard.
(1) The stage of the demand for shelter. Within this stage,
most of population in the society demand only a minimum living
space with shelters to keep warm and survive.
(2) The stage of the demand for function. The people's demand
for a living space within this stage is not only a shelter but
also a dwelling with rooms for different functions and facilities
to fulfill requirements of regular life.
(3) The stage of demand for comfort and privacy. The residents
demand within this stage are houses with comfortable environ-
ment and private rooms.
(4) The stage of demand for luxury. The people's demand at this
stage is to raise the comfortable standard of houses, facilities
and living environment in order to enjoy a luxurious life.7
The evolution of these four stages of housing demands
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parallel the process of five stage of industrialization for
developing countries within the "Theory of Development Stages".
For the first two stages in housing demand, the involvement of
government and public institutes is important and necessary.
The purpose of involvement is to help establish a housing
market system.
(ii) Housing Development And Regional Development
According to the "Theory of Development Stages", after
the import of capital and new technology, the social conditions
of equilibrium in the traditional society of the developing
country break down. Following the process of industrialization,
society enters the stage of transition. Within this stage,
urbanization and the change of social structure dominate the
process of development. The issue of housing shortage within
the urban area becomes increasingly serious during the process
of urbanization. The major problem of housing shortage in most
developing countries at this stage that of great demand for
basic shelters for the social majority - the numerous new
urban immigrants and blue-collar workers. At the same time,
large amounts of slums and squatter areas are spreading all
over the urban site and are growing rapidly. The over-crowded
living conditions and poor quality of these urban areas may
create serious crises of public sanitation and social security.
These crises have directly negative impact on the growth of
industrialization. Resolution of the problem cannot depend on
operation of "free" market forces in the existing housing
market, because of four major constraints in the operation
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of the housing market within most developing countries:
(1) Unlike other industrial production, the process of housing
production is much more complex. The materials of production
usually are very expensive, large amounts of skilled labor is
needed. These three conditions render general housing production
much more expensive than most of the other processes of
industrial production.
(2) The cost of housing construction also directly depends on
the real estate market. The rapid growth of the urban population
causes land prices also to increase rapidly. As a result, it
becomes increasingly impossible for the majority of the
population to purchase a piece of suitable land for a reasonable
price.
(3) At the transition stage of development, the problem of
uneven income distribution is still very serious. The majority
of the population's income is too low to afford the expenses
of middle-income population is too scarce to establish a
housing market.
(4) During this period, domestic saving and capital accumulation
remain at a very basic level, because the social forces of
production are at the stage of transition. Therefore, the
capital market system has not yet developed to a full extent.
Most of the domestic capital and foreign capital are invested
in short term and high profit labor-intensive industries. Very
little capital would be invested in the housing industry, which
8is relatively long-term and low-profit production.
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Under these four major social constraints, it is impossible
to develop a free market system of large-scale housing produc-
tion in order to solve the emerging serious problems of
housing shortage. The planners then initiate a series of
policies which involve primarily the government and the capita-
lists to solve the housing crises and promote the continuous
development of social forces of production. Within these
strategies, the government should devote its effort and invest-
ment on constructing infrastructure for further large-scale
housing and industrial development in urban areas. In order to
meet the needs of a rapidly increasing urban population,
emphasis should be placed on eliminating the slums and
squatter areas in order to improve the living environment
for the urban majority, and building public housing for those
urban destitutes who are completely unable to solve their own
problems of habitation. Through these efforts, the government
can create a better and more stable urban environment as a
basic condition to promote more progressive development. The
return on the government's investment can obtained from
increasing income tax on private industrial and manufacturing
businesses during a later period of development. Urban planners
declare that the resolution of housing shortage problems for
the workers remains the responsibility of the owners of those
industrial factories and manufacturing businesses. The
construction of workers' housing benefits not only the workers,
but also the bosses. A stable and suitable living environment
is the first precondition for the workers to increase their
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productive force of labor. The increased labor of the workers
will be the largest profit for the capitalists' housing
investment. The planners believe that, within the developing
society, if these three major groups - the government, the
capitalists, and the working class can be pursuaded to coop-
erate, then not only will the crisis of housing shortage be
solved, but also the progress of the industrialization can
be promoted rapidly.
Following the evolution of social production and industrial
development, the social forces of production are improved,
capital accumulation is increased, and the social welfare
policy promoted. Consequently, the developing society will
enter the development stage of take-off. At this stage, the
income of majority has increased and their living standard
improved. The population of the middle-income class has begun
to increase, and the majority of society should be in the
middle-income class by the end of this stage. During this
period, people would begin to demand better dwellings. Housing
development would then enter the stage of demand for function.
According to the planners' theory, housing development at this
time should emphasize the developing of a complete housing
market. Most of the government's housing development policies
should be proposed and implemented on the basis of assisting
and encouraging the development of such a housing market. The
policies may include, for example, the establishment of an
"Institution of Public Saving Fund" to help part of the middle
and low-income population save their income for purchasing
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housing. Also, public loan institututions may be set up for
long-term, low-interest loans to help the majority of people
purchase their own dwellings, and encouraging private finance
institutes to set up housing construction loans in order to
accumulate capital for promoting the development of housing
construction industries. Large-scale housing construction will
not only stimulate related industries, increase the employment
opportunities, and improve levels of comsumption, but also
create better conditions for further development of society.
Theoretically speaking, a general system of housing market
should be established by the end of this development period.
(iii) New Town Development
During the take-off period, the concept of "new town"
should be brought into housing and regional development. At
this stage, urbanization is still proceeding rapidly. Some
large urban areas have expanded into the scale of metropolis.
Physical expansion of the urban environment has certain limi-
tations, such as density of population, transportation facilities,
system of sewer management and water supply, and the system of
public services. If urbanization occurs too fast and out of
control, many physical and social urban crises will appear.
For urban and regional planning within this stage, the over-
growth of certain urban areas will become one of the most
important issues facing the planners. According to-the general
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theory of regional planning, planners would usually resort to
the concept of "new town" development as the best solution to
this issue. "New town" development can not only release the
emerging physical pressures of rapid growth and create better
physical conditions for further development, but also control
9
the stable growth of both the physical and social environment.
These are the most important factors for further development,
which would lead the society into the next mature stage of
development.
The success of "new town" development completely depends
on the government's planning process. The emphasis of the
planning process at this stage should be on the encouragement
of private investment in developing industries, and large-
scale housing construction for the social majority, composed
of blue-collar workers and the middle-and-low income population.
Therefore, to promote new town development in a certain selected
site, the government should be responsible for the construction
of development infrastructure and public facilities, and the
establishment of legislation to encourage private investment.
Large-scale, private investment in housing construction will
become a major factor in establishing a comprehensive system
of domestic market for housing.
After entering the mature stage of development, society
will gradually progress into the "industrialized stage". During
this period, the majority of the population's demand for housing
will also turn to demands for comfort and privacy. During this
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time, a comprehensvie, dynamic housing market system should be
established. Housing development under these conditions will
operate according to the force of demand and supply.
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B. The U.S. Aid Development Period (1949-1952, 195 3-1964)
a. The Essence of U.S. Aid
During this period of development, U.S. Aid to Taiwan
amounted to a total of U.S.$1473.3 million (Talbe II-1). Aid
was supplied under three different categories: loan (U.S.$254
million), grant (U.S.$1,209 million) and surplus agricultural
commodities. Loan was on six-month terms with 4% annual interest
rate. According to the nature of investment, U.S. Aid was
invested in four major divisions: (a) the import of raw materials
for processing industries; (b) the import of machinery and
equipment; (c) the import of modern technology and knowledge,
for example, "technical assistance" from U.S. experts and pro-
fessionals and the setting up of "special training programs"
for Chinese; (d) the import of consumer goods. Therefore, U.S.
Aid played a very important role in Taiwan's development.
(1) From Table 11-2, we see that capital assistance amounted
to U.S. $810 million, which represented 31% of Taiwan's net- domestic
investment. 7 4% of the toatl U.S. capital was invested in intra-
structural construction.
(2) U.S. aid bridged the gap between Taiwan's domestic savings
and investment. Figures show that domestic saving financed
72% of investment in 1951, 40% in 1956, and 96% in 1963.
(3) The government experienced a large budgetary deficit, over
half of which was spending on military expenditures. U.S. Aid
financed over 90% of the deficit.(Table 11-3)
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(4) Taiwan's economy was stabilized by U.S. Aid through the im-
port of consumer goods to meet local demand. Aid financed 43%
of imported goods and services in 1952 and 12% in 1965.
(5) Investment went into the development of infrastructure
(power, transport and transportation facilities), agriculture,
human resources and industries.
(6) During the aid period, about one-third of total development
resources were supplied by the U.S.
According to a study of the U.S. Aid program, aid constituted
about U.S.$10 per capita income per year, and 6.4% of the GNP
over the entire period. As a result, Taiwan's GNP rose from
U.S.$876 million in 1951 to U.S.$2,357 million in 1965 (Table
11-4). With an average growth rate of 7.6% in real GNP (deducting
3.3% of average growth rate in population), Taiwan had a higher
economic growth rate than any of the other Asian countries except
Japan. Taiwan also based the majority of its military defense
upon the U.S. Aid program.
b. Development Institutions
Before 1952, Taiwan's development was formulated upon a
temporary development plan initiated under the U.S. Aid program.
The first central economic development institution -- "Council
for Economic Stability, Executive Yuan" (CES) in charge of
planning and implementation of a island-wide development was
established in 1953. The president of the Executive Yuan
served concurrently as the head of CES. The council was
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composed of ministers from four ministries in the central
government, the Joint Chief of Staff, the head of JCRR
(Sino-U.S.A. Joint Commission On Rural Reconstruction), the
Bureau of Central Trust and Division of Finance in the
provincial government, and the secretary of U.S. Aid commi-
ssion. Under this council, there were four committees in
charge of initiating, planning, and implementing a series
of four year economic development plans. In 1958, CES was
cancelled and responsibilities were shifted to the Ministry
of Economic Affairs and the Ministry of Communication.
After five years' implementation, it was very clear that
the man-power, the techniques, and the experience of these
two ministries were insufficient to manage such large-scale
projects. Therefore, in 1963, the central government decided
to establish a new organization -- Council For International
Economic Cooperation And Development (CIECD) to be in charge
of all the major affairs of planning and development.
CIECD was organized by the industry and mining committee,
the agricultural committee, the transportation committee, and
the industrial development and investment research committee
and the economic research center of U.S. Aid commission etc.
During this period, U.S.Aid commission had great influence on
the decision-making process of these central government
development institutions in planning and implementing the
series of four-year economic development plans.
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Foot Notes:
The references for this section is extracted from the
article:
Lin T.Y. "Urban And Regional Planning In Taiwan", The
Bank of Taiwan, Quarterly, Vol.24, No.3, Taipei,
Taiwan Press, 1968.
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c. Capital, Market, Resources, Technique And Labor Force
Capital
Capital formation for Taiwan's development came from both
the public sector and the private sector. In terms of domestic
capital formation, the public sector occupied over half of
total and primarily consisted of three sources -- government
monopoly enterprises, the income of public property and land,
and the U.S.Aid fund. As I mentioned before, after Taiwan's
recovery, government monopoly enterprises not only included
those taken over from the Japanese colonial government, but
also some of the important private industries and enterprises,
such as those of sugar production, electricity, fertilizer,
cement production, paper production, aluminum smelting,
petroleum smelting and steel and iron smelting etc. The
large scale of government monopoly enterprises controlled the
major part of domestic capital and industrial production in
Taiwan. For example, in 1951, 62% of total income of industrial
10
production went into public monopoly enterprises.
Since the recovery, all the land and public property of
the colonial government had been confiscated by the government.
Confiscated property amounted to quite a fortune, especially
the land. As I mentioned in section I, before the recovery,
over 80% of cultivated land and most of forests belonged to
the government. After 1951, most of the public cultivated
land was rented or sold to the peasants by the government
through the process of "Land Reform" in order to increase
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public capital accumulation. All the public forests came under
the authority of the Forestry Bureau of the central government
and became one of the important public monopoly businesses.
U.S.Aid capital played an important role in public
capital accumulation. Within the Aid period, 80.1% of total
U.S.Aid capital was invested in the public sector. Only 19.9%
of U.S.Aid capital flowed into private enterprises. U.S.Aid
capital helped not only to cover the government's budgetary
deficit but also to promote public capital accumulation.
The capital for the development of private industries
and enterprises mainly came from four sources -- the private
capital of some national capitalists brought from mainland
China after 1949, the capital of local landlords and righ
peasants transferred from rural sectors to industrial and
urban sectors through the government's implementation of
"Land Reform" policies, foreign investment capital, and U.S.Aid
capital. Within this period, foreign investment capital only
occupied 6.9% of the total amount of private capital formation,
while U.S.Aid investment occupied 11.9%.
Market
A vital operating market system is one of the most
important preconditions for rapid development, according to
the conventional theory. But at the beginning of the Aid
period, Taiwan's consumption capacity was very low and the
development of domestic market was very limited, mainly
because of the destruction of World War II and the serious
impact of civil war from mainland China which followed. In
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addition, physical conditions of this small and isolated
island, such as the scarcity of arable land and nature
resources became the major limitations for advanced develop-
ment of the domestic market system. Therefore, the emphasis
of island-wide development must be on the establishment of
an international market-trading system.
During the initial period, the development focus should
be on the establishment of close relationships between the
market systems of the U.S. and Japan and domestic production
in order to stimulate the progress of Taiwan's social force
of production. This development strategy was initiated and
implemented by CES, the MEA and MC, and CIECD within a series
of Four-Year Economic Development Plans under the assistance
of U.S. experts. The implementation of this principle can be
identified by the percentage of value of Taiwan's imports and
exports to principal trading countries.
Resources
Taiwan's aboveground and underground resources are very
limited, especially mineral resources. During the colonial
period, development of the agricultural sector completely
depended on intensive labor, large amounts of fertilizer
imported from Japan, and the major construction efforts in
water conservation by the colonial government. During the late
colonial period, socalled "industrialization" mainly focused
on supporting the Japanese military invasion. Most of established
industries were light and processing industries, because of
natural limitation and colonial policies, and most of resources
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for these industries were imported as well.
After the recovery, under the assistance of U.S.Aid experts,
the government began to search for the best way to overcome
these limitations in order to pursue the fastest path to
industrialization. From various reports that were made during
this period, it was declared that a fast rate of industriali-
zation could not be achieved on the basis of self sufficiency
and reliance on domestic resources. Large-scale import of
resources was necessary for rapid growth and development. In
other words, Taiwan's industrialization must depend on heavy
imports of raw resources and close ties with foreign markets.
Technology
In the fifty years of Japanese occupancy, Taiwan's social
forces of production began to step into the primary stage of
capitalist production, and the basic system of industrialization
had been developed. But with the end of the Japanese occupation,
all the Japanese experts retreated to Japan, taking with them
all the technology that Taiwan needed badly for development.
Under these circumstances, basic reconstruction of industrial
facilities faced serious problems.
Therefore, then, under the U.S.Aid program, large numbers
of U.S. and Japanese experts came to Taiwan with their advanced
technology to assist in the reconstruction and development of
industries. But this assistance did not include any training
programs for Taiwan to develop its own skills and technology,
except for very few trainning programs in simple techniques of
operation. Because of this, although Taiwan's development grew
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faster than most of other developing countries, complete depend-
ency on imports of foreign technology became one of the major
characteristics of Taiwan's process of industrialization.
Labor Forces
The plentiful supply of labor was seen as the most
important asset for industrialization in Taiwan. Before the
recovery, surplus labor existed in the rural areas, because
of the colonial agricultural policies of labor-intensive
production. This created the potential for the development of
the industrial labor market. Moreover, within the period
between 1949 and 1952, there were more than two million
immigrants who retreated with the government from mainland
China to Taiwan. Except for some who were government employees,
immigrants naturally became part of Taiwan's surplus labor
market, and all the surplus labor gathered around several
large urban areas. This created a most beneficial condition
for the initial development of small-scale industries and
family-size factories. Within the period of 50's, these kinds
of small industries and handicraft factories expanded very
rapidly in the urban sectors. Most of them were engaged in the
production of commodities and simple processing industries.
After the late 50's, some of the big landlords and righ
peasants transferred their capital from rural sectors to
industrial and manufacturing businesses and became the new
national bourgeoisis class in urban sectors. At the same time,
private foreign investment in Taiwan's industries and
manufacturing enterprises began to increase rapidly due to
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a series of foreign investment acts published by the govern-
ment to ensure and protect high profits for foreign investment
in Taiwan. The surplus labor force in both rural and urban
sectors began to flow into the newly established businesses
and industries of national bourgeois and foreign capitalists.
d. Agriculture
During the initial period of Taiwan's recovery, most of
the population still belonged to the agricultural sector, and
agricultural production occupied the major part of domestic
production. Within Taiwan's society, although part of the
industrial and manufacturing sector had entered the stage of
capitalist-production, agricultural production in large rural
areas still remained at the stage of feudalism, due to the
agricultural policies of the ex-colonial government. Class
differences among landlords, righ peasants and peasants were
very serious. The feudalistic relation in agricultural produc-
tion became the major constraint upon development of productive
forces in large rural areas.
Under the U.S.Aid program, the government undertook a
series of survey and planning processes for purposes of further
development. It was realized that the basis of long-term
industrialization in Taiwan must lay in the development of
agricultural production. In order to promote the development of
agricultural production, the existing feudalistic relations of
production in large rural areas must be eliminated. Therefore,
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between 1949-1953, the central government launched a Land
Reform Policy to improve the general rural relation of
production. This policy included:
(1) In 1949, land rent was reduced to 37.5% of the main corps;
the landlord received approximately a similiar amount of
foodstuffs from the local government as rent instead. The
duration of lease was extended to a minimum of six years.
(2) In 1951, public land was sold to the tenant peasants.
(3) In 1953, a final effort was made to implement the "Land to
the Tillers" program, through a procedure of compulsory
purchase of farm land from landlords and resale to farmers.
The compensation to landlords was paid 70% with land bonds
and 30% with government stock shares.
Some of the most important accomplishments are the
following:
(1) Farmers worked harder on their own land after the new
policy was implemented ; production increased 20%. The
average income of the farm tenants increased by 30% and
11
6,600 tenant families had purchased land by the end of 1951.
From 1949-1956, a total of 77,965 tenant families bought
farm land with their own resources as a result of the sale
of public land with the completion of the "Land to the Tiller"
program. The government resold private land to 194,823 tenant
families, and 71% of public and private leased farm land was
transferred to private ownership by the tenant farmers.12
(2) During 1949-1965, agricultural production showed great
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prosperity. The amount of net domestic investment on agricul-
ture and industry was U.S.$329 million (12.6% of the total)
and U.S.$1,218 million (46.8% of the total). The amount of
U.S. capital assistance on agriculture and industry was
U.S.$193 million (23.8% of the total) and U.S.$ 157 million
(19.4% of the total). Agriculture played a very important role
in Taiwan's development during the U.S.Aid period. Agricultural
products occupied around 35% of GNP before 1965.
The agricultural sector also provided very important
resources for public capital accumulation. According to
"Land Reform" policies, the farmers paid for public farm
land according to a seasonal ten-year installment plan. For
each season, farmers' payment took the form of crops. The
price of crops was decided by the government, which ended up
being always 15%-20% lower than the market price.
The tax payment by the agricultural sector formed an
important resource for government income. Around one-third
of government direct tax was collected from the agricultural
sector. According to a report "Tax Burden For Taiwan's People"
(published in 1971), in 1966, the burden of direct tax for a
farmer's family was 1.73 time heavier than an non-farmer's .
family. The total burden of tax for a farmer's family occupied
6.95% of their total income of production, and 21.73% of their
annual net income, if their income was under U.S.$ 2,500
annually.
Profits from sale of fertilizer to farmers was another
important method of public capital accumulation. The importing
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and production of fertilizer was a principal public monopoly.
Usually, for Taiwan's agricultural production, the cost of
fertilizer occupied around one-forth of the total cost of
production. The only channel for farmers to acquire fertilizer
was from the government fertilizer agencies. According to
government regulations, the farmers must pay the price of
fertilizer by crops. But the government price for fertilizer
was 23% higher than market price and 53% higher than factory
prices (Statistic Data from Taiwan Foodstuff Bureau in 1966)
e.Industry
Industrial development within the U.S.Aid period focused
upon public monopoly businesses. For the total amount of U.S.
Aid fund, only 6.9% flowed into private businesses, 27% into
the semi-public enterprises, and the rest was occupied
completely by public monopoly enterprises.
Since 1952, a series of four year economic development
plans were implemented. For the first two periods of the
four-year plans (1952-1955, 1956-1959), the major ephasis of
industrial development was on electric power, sugar production,
fertilizer, textiles, petroleum, cement food processing, timer
and paper manufacturing. Within these, all the large-scale
industries such as electric power, sugar-production, fertilizer,
petroleum and cement were monopolized by the government. Some
of the others, such as textile and timer were semi-private.
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Most of the private industries developed within the 50's
were the small scale or family-style, simple processing
industries. Investment in these industries was poor and capital
accumulation slow. Moreover, the investment of U.S.Aid funds
and private foreign capital in these industries were very
limited. All of these factors restricted the growth and
development of private industries. Under this situation, at
the beginning of the third four-year development plan, govern-
ment policy began to emphasize export expansion.
In 1960, the policy of Promulgation of the Statute for
Excouragement of Investment was published by the Executive
Yuan. Under this policy, all foreign enterprises in Taiwan
receive considerable protection by law. For instance, there
is a four-year exemption from income tax, profit can be
remitted easily without any limitations, there is an exemption
from customs duty on imports of raw materials and manufacturing
supplies for re-export, and 100% ownership of foreign investors
is allowed in order to facilitate investment in industrial
production. At the same time, dur to a rapid increase in wage
rates and manufacturing costs in Japan and Hong Kong since
the beginning of the 1960's, Taiwan had the advantage of righ
labor force and lower labor cost in comparison with the above
two areas.
Under these two favorable conditions -- the government's
encouragement policy and the comparatively low cost of labor,
private foreign investment in Taiwan's industrial sector
increased more than five times in 1960, compared to the average
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annual investment figures for the 1950's. Investment continued
to increase rapidly for the rest of the U.S. Aid period of the
60's. The large amount of foreign investment stimulated the
export economy and the industrial development of private and
semi-private enterprises. Emerging large-scale industries
within the late U.S. Aid period included those of electrical
appliance and electronic equipment, timber, chemical and food
processing.
Some public and semi-public heavy industries also developed
very rapidly due to the investment of foreign capital and
technology, such as those of petroleum, chemistry, steel,
automobile, electric power and fertilizer etc.
Generally speaking, the latter five-year period (1960-
1964) of U.S. Aid was the turning period for Taiwan's
industrial development, due to government development stra-
tegies and the change of social and economic structure.
(Detailed discussion is in the article "Technical Change,
Foreign Investment , And Growth in Taiwan's Manufacturing
Industries 1952-1970", Economic Review Monthly, Jan. & Feb. 1975)
f. Urbanization And Change of Social Structure
A complete and systematic study on urbanization and change
of social structure in Taiwan has never been accomplished after
1950. During the first decade of retreat from mainland China,
the government emphasized the enforcement of military, political
and economic control to maintain the stability of Taiwan's
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society. After 1960, although some studies had been done by
scholars and public institutions in response to the emerging
seriousness of social problems caused by rapid urbanization
and change of social structure, the development agencies have
never been able to implement any effective policies and
strategies to solve the problems. This is mainly due to the
general concepts held by these public agencies. They consider
urbanization and most of the social and physical problems
caused by it to be unavoidable phenomena during the process
of industrialization.
Taiwan's urbanization began in the late colonial period.
But the development of urbanization was slow during that period
because of the restriction of existing feudalistic relation of-
production in large rural sectors and colonial exploitation.
Within the period between 1949-1952, the government
retreated completely from mainland China to Taiwan. Most of
the government organizations of administration, army, police,
bank and commercial services followed the government's retreat
and migrated into several large urban areas in Taiwan. Following
this retreat and migration, nearly two million of the mainland
population moved to Taiwan and settled in these urban areas.
Except for the six hundred thousand in military forces, there
were over one million mainlanders that moved into Taiwan's urban
sectors within five years (1947-1951). Most of these were
intellecturals, government employees, businessmen, and skilled
laborers.
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The sudden increase in urban population stimulated the
development of urbanization. Large numbers of small-scale shops,
resturants, factories, and manufacturing businesses emerged in
the urban sectors. At the same time, the government's "Land
Reform" policy disrupted the feudalistic relation of production
in Taiwan's large rural sectors. Large numbers of big and
middle landlords and rich farmers lost their land and influence
in rural sectors. Only a small part of big landlords transferred
their capital and influence successfully from the rural sectors
to urban sectors and began to operate modern-style enterprises
under the heavy protection of the government. Moreover, large
amounts of U.S. Aid capital came into urban sectors and was
invested in the construction of the infrastructure.
Under these kinds of development conditions, a new
national bourgeoisie class emerged in the urban sectors within
a short time period. This new class included the big local
landlords, the original mainland bourgleois, the relatives of
mainland bureaucrats and some of the local rich businessmen
emerging from ex-colonial enterprises through the abnormal
(sometimes illegal) operations of speculation during the transi-
tion period. But conditions of limited local markets, capital
and technology soon became the major obstacles for their
development during the late 50's.
After 1960 a series of government acts for the encourage-
ment of foreign investment and development of export production
helped to overcome the restrictions on further development.
Large amounts of foreign investment and experts came into the
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urban sectors. Also, numerous large-scale factories and
manufacturing enterprises became concentrated in several
large urban areas due to the conveniences of administrative
and infrastructural services, banking and commercial services.
The booming development of these urban industries absorbed
large amounts of surplus labor from rural sector. The pace of
urbanization increased rapidly. (the urban population increased
from 32.6% of total population in 1958 to 42.6% in 1962)
According to government statistics, in 1952, 61.3% of the
total employed population in Taiwan belonged to agricultural
sectors, in comparason to 56.3% in 1960. 1964 was the first
year in which the non-agricultural employed population equaled
that of agriculture, and in 1965, the employed population of
the agricultural sector only occupied 47.6% of the total.
These figures indicate a great change of social structure in
that large amounts of agricultural laborers migrated into the
industrial sectors and formed a new social class - the urban
workers.
This new group of urban migrants contained more children
and older males than that of the migration streams in most
Western countries, according to the study of an American
scholar Speare A.J. in his book "The Determinants of Rural to
Urban Migration in Taiwan" in 1968. Most of these migrants
entered the processing and manufacturing industries. They
worked 10-14 hours a day. Some joined the urban service sectors.
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In general, most of the emerging urban workers were un-
skilled, and their wages were far below that of the average
wage. For the children and older people, the situation was
worse than for others. There were no social welfare programs
provided. Furthermore, workers' unions which could have been
the only institutions that would have protected their interests
were prohibited because of government martial law. At the end
of the U.S.Aid period, this new class occupied over half of
the urban population in Taiwan.
g. Housing Development
(i) The Origins of Housing Problems -- Urban Slum and Squatters
During the period between 1947-1951, there were over two
million mainland immigrants in the urban areas. A small part
were government employees. For these government employees,
only 57% of the total were able to get public housing; the rest
were forced to solve their own housing problems. The sudden
increase in demand for urban housing for these two million new
immigrants raised both the rent and land price in the urban
areas to a level that the average citizen was not able to afford.
In order to obtain emergency shelter, most mainland
immigrants were forced to occupied public or some private
vacant land plots and construct simple and crude dwellings
with their own hands. Usually these houses appeared in groups.
This is the origin of large-scale urban slums and squatters.
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Following the pace of urbanization, these slums and
squatters grew rapidly because of continuous inflow of new
urban migrants from the surrounding rural countryside. During
the 50's most of the slums and squatters were concentrated
around downtown areas. Most residents earned their living
either by operating small home-style businesses and handicraft
factories or by offering their labor in part-time employment.
But following the development of industrialization, most
of these small business and factories were forced to bankruptcy,
because of their inability to complete with emerging larger-
scale business. At the same time, the price of public and
private land occupied by slums and squatters also rose higher
and higher because of continuing urbanization. In 1957, the
government began to initiate urban renewal plans in order to
eliminate these slums and squatters and pursue a better usage
of urban land.
After 1960, large amounts of capital flowed into the
urban sectors. This stimulated the booming development of urban
areas. Part of the capital went into the land speculation
business. Because of the operation of these capital, the urban
land price increased 11 times the average price during the U.S.
Aid period (1949-1965), according to government's statistics.
Meanwhile, the government begin to implement the "plan for
eliminating slums and squatters" in 1961. Old slum and
squatter areas began to disappear in downtown areas and new
commercial districts were soon allocated.
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But the problems of slums and squatters had not been
resolved. New slums and squatters began to appear in every
district of the urban areas, and their expansion was faster
than ever, dur to the rapid urbanization after 1960. The
physical environment of the new slums and squatters was worse
than that of the old. "The Survey and Study for Landownership
and Housing Facilities of the Slums in Taipei City" published
in 1969 is a very good reference in understanding the physical
conditions of slum area during the late U.S. Aid period. The
major references and maps of this study came from the city
government's statistical studies in 1964. The studies covered
all the ten districts in Taipei city.
According to the survey, in terms of landownership, 75.35%
of total slum units were constructed on public land, 15.50% was
on self-owned land, 9.15% was on rented or leased land. In
terms of dwelling ownership, 66.80% of total slum families
owned their house, 32% were rented from landlords, only 1.2%
lived in public housing units, 86.68% of total units were
squatters.
For the income survey, within the slum area, labor income
occupied 58.51% of total income, commercial income including
the income of venders or small grocery stores occupied 19.82%,
wage income occupied 19%, and property income only occupied
0.51%. 84-31% of total family monthly income was below U.S.$ 40.
There were no family monthly incomes over U.S.$ 150.
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As for expentiture, 93.45% of total income was expended
on food, housing, clothing and transportation. Only 3.1% was
expended on expanded on education, 1.57% on health treatment,
and 1.33% on entertainment.
In terms of housing facilities, 57.06% of total slum
families had no living room. 49.50% had no kitchen space,
9.35% of the families share the kitchen with others. 77.13% of
total families had no toilets at all, and 7.96% shared toilets
with others.
For the average space of the houses, each slum family unit
occupied 237.24 sqft, within which the living room occupied
82.8 sqft, the kitchen occupied 59.76 sqft, and the bedroom
only 163.08 sqft. The average population of each slum family
was 5.59 members.
Generally speaking, during the late U.S. Aid period, the
average monthly income for a slum family with almost six
members was U.S.$ 28.91, and average expenses were U.S.$ 29.66.
Most of these families had no living room and toilet. Half of
the families had no kitchen and had to cook outdoors or in
the living room or bedrooms. Each person had 29.17 sqft space
to sleep. Such living conditions as these were clearly sub-
standard.
(ii) Housing Development Agency and Housing Policies
Within the period between 1947-1952, the social increase
of two million mainland immigrants caused the problems of
housing shortage, slums and squatters in urban areas. These
problems of housing shartage, slums and squatters in urban areas.
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These problems caused the deterioration of both social and
physical urban environments.
Finally in 1955, with the assistance of housing experts
of the U.S. Aid program, the "Council for Construction of
Public Housing" (CCPH) was organized directly under the authority
of Executive Yuan. This committee was in charge of all the
affairs of administration, finance and loans, construction,
distribution, design and research of public housing.
From 1955 to 1958, CCPH had initiated several different
kinds of housing loan regulations. The most important achieve-
ment of this council was the initiation of the "Regulation of
Loans for the Construction of Public Housing" in 1957. It had
been published by the central government in July 25th, 1957.
This regulation established the base for a long-term (not
less than ten years) and low-interest (must not exceed 0.6%
annual interest loan) loan policy of public housing construc-
tion. According to this regulation, the debtor organization
of housing loan had the right of mortgage to the creditors.
At the end of 1958, the central government considered
that the base for the promotion of public housing construction
had been established. Therefore, the CCPH was abolished. All
the business of public housing construction was then taken
over by the Taiwan Provincial government.
In January 1959, a new "Commission for Construction of
Public Housing" (CCPH) under the authority of provincial
government was set up as the organization responsible for
design guidance. All the business activities of public
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housing construction had been distributed to the relevant
departments, bureaus, or offices of the provincial governments.
For example, the business of housing planning, design and
construction was assigned to the Public Housing Construction
Department of the Public Construction Bureau.
A new "Regulation for Management of Public Housing
Construction (RMPHC), Taiwan Province" had been published in
1959 by provincial government in order to make up the defici-
encies of the "Regulation of Loan for Public Housing Construction"
(RLPHC).
According to the regulations stated in the RLPHC, Taiwan's
society was at the transition stage of development, and there-
fore, the object of public housing loans should be workers,
farmers, fishermen, government employees and general citizens.
According to the regulation of RMPHC, public housing constru-
tion should be implemented in the following four ways --
(1) offering housing loan for self-construction, (2) constructing
public housing by government, (3) encouraging housing construc-
tion of private investment and (4) offering housing loan to
government organization for the construction of employees'
housing.
As far as priority in offering housing loan, the RLPHC
regulated that the first priority should be given to low-
income groups of workers, farmers and fishermen. But according
to RMPHC, the priority for offering housing loans should be as
follows: (1) the government's construction of public housing
within destinated residential zone, (2) construction of public
-93-
housing aimed at the elimination of squatters, (3) construction
of housing along with urban renewal, (4) construction of general
public housing13
(iii) Housing Finance and Development of Public Housing
Construction
Within the U.S. Aid period, the situation for all the
government supported public housing construction was as follows:
(1) From 1950-1954, 1,100 housing units were constructed under
the policy of financial and technical cooperation between the
government and private institutions for housing construction.
(2) In 1953, because of the devastation of typhoons, thousands
of people lost their homes. Under the financial support of the
U.S. Aid program, the local govrnment and private institutions
constructed 4,677 public housing units in order to resolve
the emergency housing shortages for laborers, mining workers,
and low-income families.
(3) In 1955, CCPH under the Executive Yuan was organized. The
financial support of CCPH for public housing construction came
from two major sources: the U.S. Aid housing loan (N.T.$
33,495,100) assigned to the construction of public housing
for workers, farmers, fishermen and general low-income citizens,
and the public bank housing loan (N.T.$31,211,700) assigned to
particular housing construction for government representatives
14
and officials.
Under the CCPH policy of public housing construction,
U.S. Aid housing loans were transferred through local workers,
farmers, or fishermen organizations and the local government to
citizens. Conditions of the loan were regulated as follows:
(a) the creditor must own his land for housing construction,
(b) the maximum loan for workers, farmers and fishermen was
N.T.$ 20,000 and N.T.$ 40,000 for general citizens, (c) the
loan could only cover half the cost of construction, the rest
had to be paid by the creditor, (d) the period of repayment
was three years and the monthly interest 1.5%. Under this
policy, 1596 units of farmer's housing, 3139 units or worker's
housing and 1413 units of general housing were constructed.
In 1957, under U.S. Aid policies, this amount of loan was
transferred to public housing grants to the government. At
the end of 1958, the government's total income from grant and
14
interest cause to N.T.$ 112,994,379.
Loan regulations by public banks for housing construction
of government officials were as follows: (a) the creditors must
own the land for housing construction, (b) the maximum loan
could exceed 90% (three-year loan) or 80% (four-year loan) of
the total cost of construction, (c) repayment can be three
years of four years, and the monthly interest is 1%.
(4) After 1959, a new CCPH of the Taiwan provincial government
was organized. New policies, of RMPHC were published to deal
with the deficiencies of RLPHC under the U.S. Aid program.
According to RLPHC, funds for public housing loans came
primarily from U.S. Aid loans. The new RMPHC regulated that
except for U.S. grants, part of the income of urban taxes and
social welfare funds should also be appropriated to the
15
construction of public housing.
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Within RLPHC, regulations were that the interest rate
for public housing construction loans must not exceed 0.6%
annually, and the period of installment should not be less
than ten years. Under the new RMPHC; (a) the interest rate
was raised to 0.5% monthly, and the period of installment is
15 years, (b) the interest for private investment in housing
construction will be according to the contract of loan and
the installment period is 10 years, (c) interest on land
purchase for housing construction is 0.75% monthly, and the
period of installment is 5 years, (d) low-income public
housing should be constructed by the government. Low-income
families could either buy or rent the housing from government.
Down payment for low-income housing was 1% of the total sales
price and the rest could be paid for by a 20-year installment
plan without interest. The rent for low income housing is
16
0.2% of the sales price monthly.
According to RMPHC, from 1959-1967, total loans for
housing construction amounted to N.T.$ 2,372,1 3 3 ,144. 36.
76,327 housing units were constructed with the financial aid
of this loan. Achievements of RMPHC included:
(a) 24,287 housing units for general citizens. N.T.$1,581,594,809.98
loan.
(b) 18,671 housing units for reconstruction after damage
N.T.$289,643,600 loan.
(c) 13,498 housing units for repairs after typhoon damages.
N.T.$9,121,400 loan.
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(d) 3,231 housing units constructed with private investment.
N.T.$156,755,357.30 loan.
(e) 1,811 housing units for government employees. N.T.186,763,300 loan.
(f) 4,555 low-income housing units for elimination squatter and
slums. N.T.$145,254,667.38 loan.
17(g) 274 low-income housing units. N.T.$11,896,ooo loan.
During the latter period of U.S. Aid, the most serious
problems of housing shortages were caused by the emerging
class of low-income urban workers and residents. But for the
above newly constructed housing units, low income housing
units only occupied 6.3% of the total. 6.6% of the total
public funding was appropriated for low-income groups. The
RMPHC also promoted the development of private housing
construction and real estate business. 73..2% of the public
funds for housing construction went to this sector.
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C. The Export Development Period
a. The Change of Development Structure
After ten years of U.S. Aid development, Taiwan had
established some foundation on which to base its financial and
economic development. In 1960, the government initiated the
policy that changed the nature of Taiwan's development from one
of U.S. Aid dependency to that of self-sufficiency in order to
wean itself from U.S. Air program. The major goal of the policy
was to promote Taiwan's industrialization and export-trade
economy. The government implemented this policy at the beginning
of the third four-year development plan in 1961. The four major
thrusts of this policy were: (1) the establishment of protective
tariff rates in order to protect and ensure the profit of several
important existing local industries. (2) legislation of prefer-
ential investment lay for promoting capital accumulation for rapid
industrialization, especially to foreign investors. (3) publi-
shing of the export promotion incentives to stimulate the rapid
growth of export trading businesses. (4) price control of major
agricultural products in order to creat a favorable investment
environment for investors. Under these guidelines, some of
public monopoly businesses were transferred to private hands.
Within the period of 1960-1972 the above government policies
played very important roles in directing the growth of manufac-
turing industries in Taiwan.
By 1965, the U.S. officially announced that Taiwan had
sufficient basis for development under its own momentum and
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could maintain a GNP growth rate arround 6.3% - 7.2% per year
during the period of 1965 - 1972 without aid, Thus U.S. Aid was
terminated. Correspondingly, significant changes in the develop-
ment structure took place, and large amount of foreign capital
started to enter into Taiwan, especially from Japan.
b. Capital, Market, Technique And Labor Force
Capital
In order to promote capital accumulation in industrializa-
tion, the central government published the Promulgation of the
Statute For Encouragement of Investment in 1965, a revision of
the 1960 Statute but expanded in scope. Moreover, in 1965, a
large-scale tax and duty-free industrial processing zone was
established at the harbor of Kaoshiung. Foreign investment in
Taiwan industries and manufacturing businesses increased very
rapidly. The total amount of foreign investment ( U.S.
$1,126,788,000 ) within the period of 1965 - 1973 increased 11
times compared to that of the U.S. Aid period ( U.S.$93,106,000).
This did not includes foreign loans and U.S. grants. Foreign
capital occupied over 15% of the amount of total national public
and private capital. Within total foreign investment, overseas
Chinese capital occupied 21.8%, U.S. private capital occupied
38.9% and Japanese capital 16.6%. Some important industries relied
almost exclusively on the large inflow of foreign capital to
start their production. For instance, 55% of foreign capital
went into the chemical industry in 1963, and 40% went into
electric machinery in 1965. These two, in addition to the textile
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industries occupied 73.2% of total foreign investment for the
period of 1962 - 1969. The effect of foreign investment was not
only financial but extended also to better technical know-how,
opportunity to import parts and appliances and excellent market-
ing abroad for export expansion. Foreign loans also formed a
very important source of Taiwan's capital accumulation. For
instance, in 1965, 1967, and 1969, total foreign loan amounted
to U.S. $2,758, 1458, 2277, million, and these were 64.4,
18
24.5, 48.7 percent of total foreign investment.
(ii) Market
During the U.S. Aid period, Taiwan's market system
for international trade was extremely dependent on U.S. and
Japan. Most of the imports of raw materials and industrial
equipment came from these two countries, and most of the export
of rpocessing products also went into these two areas. Therefore,
Taiwan established a very close relationship with them. After
the establishment of the Statute For Encouragement of Investment
in 1960, large amount of U.S. and Japanese capital came into
Taiwan's capital market. Within the period of 1965 - 1973, 55.5%
of total foreign investment came from U.S. and Japan. Most of
this capital went into manufacturing industries. Foreign trade
thus expanded rapidly, especially after 1965. At such the depen-
dency of Taiwan's economy on the U.S. and Japan became more
severe.
Within the period of 1965 - 1973, the large-scale expansion
of international trading occurred mainly through the establish-
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ment of U.S. and Japanese multi-national companies in Taiwan.
Most of the multi-nation investments are establishments are
established under the name of "technical and investment
cooperation". After 1968, most of the important industries in
Taiwan such as fertilizer, electrical machinery, petrochemicals,
textile, and automobile, were controlled by multi-national
companies. Their market expanded, not only in areas of South
East Asia, U.S., Japan and some European countries but domestic-
ally as well. The operation of this market system brought exce-
llent profits for the companies ("Two Different Approaches to
investment in a Capital-Intensive Industry in R.O.C." by C.J.
Chang, Industry of Free China 1974-1975, p.179 ). But according
to statistics, Taiwan has experienced continuous annual budget
dificits on import and export affairs except the year of.1964,
1971, 1972, 1973.
(iii) Technology
According to the conventional development theory,
the development of technology can be divided into four major
steps according to the stages of development. For a developing
country within the period of transition, complete dependency on
foreign investment and advanced technology of the industrialized
world is the most efficient way to acquire the necessary capital
accumulation, to improve the productive force, to learn advanced
management technology and to expand the international market.
After entering the period of take-off, domestic capital for
development should have been accumulated, the number of skill
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labor has increased, and the basic technology for industrializa-
tion and the foreign trade market should have been established.
These factors render "technical and investment co-operation be-
tween the domestic and forwign industries" possible. Through the
co-operation, the developing society can develop its own advanced
technology. Finally, within the period of maturity, an indepen-
dent system of technology development for its own industriali-
zation should have been formed. ("Industry of Free China" 1972-
10).
In terms of Taiwan's experience, this theory appears in-
valid within the process of industrialization. Since 1968, the.
government declared that Taiwan's development can be characteri-
zed as having entered the stage of take-off. Many development
programs involving "cooperation of technology and investment"
have been set up since that time. The achievement of these
programs can be examined by following facts: (1) The quality of
labor force in Taiwan is relatively low. 1975 statistical data
of the Taiwan Provincial Labor Force Survey & Research Institute
show: College graduates comprise only 6.6% of labor force. Senior
middle school graduates account for 14.7%. Junior middle school
graduates account for 15.71%. Those with primary school education
account for 62.88% ( "China Time" 2,8, 1976 ) (2) The structure
of industry. All the major industries in Taiwan (such as elec-
trical appliances and electronics, textile, petroleum, auto-
mobile, steel, ship construction and timber ) were set up in
technical cooperation with Japan, U.S., and some European manu-
facturers. But, in fact, all the finished or semi-finished pro-
ducts are processed through assembly lines from imported
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accessories and components. For example, engines and some
essential parts ofthe automobile industry still can not be pro-
duced in domestic industry. The ship construction industry is
dependent on foreign design, foreign technical assistance and
imported components. Generally speaking, most of the industries
remain at the stage of labor-intensive production, and the basic
structure for the development of heavy and chemical industries
had not been established through the "cooperative programs"
(iii) Labor Force
After the period of U.S. Aid, the transder of the
labor force from the agricultural sector to the industrial
sector proceeded more rapidly than before, and most of the
emerging labor force also flew into the industrial sector. This
migration of labor force changed the productive structure in
Taiwan during this period. During the process several character-
istics appeared in the labor force of the manufacturing sector:
(1) uneven distribution of sex. For several leading manufacturing
industries, the female labor force increased more rapidly than
the make, and finally during the last several years, the female
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labor force comprised over 50% of the total labor force.
According to government survey data of labor force distribution
by sex in 1971, for textile industries, the female labor force
occupied 78.54% of total employment; for electrical applicances
and electronic industries 55.81%. Moreover, within Kao-shung
industrial processing zones, the first and largest one in South-
eastern Asia, 85% of total employees were female. The same char-
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acteristic also appeared in most other industiral processing zone.
(2) uneven distribution of education. As mentioned before, the
majority of the labor force consisted of employees with educa-
tional level equal or below primary school. (3) uneven distri-
bution of age. During this period, employees with ages under 19
occupied a large proportion of total. According to official data,
for the total employed population, those with age 15-19 occupied
20
22.07%. There is no official record for the large amounts of
existing and continuously increasing laborers whose age is under
15. The rural children entered the urban factories and became
young urban workers in order to support their family after they
graduated from primary school, and as such few of them had the
chance to enter middle school and continue their education.
During the initial period of industrialization, the outflow
of labor force from the agricultural sector solved the problem
of existing surplus labor. But the continuous and increasing out-
flow created a new problem of insufficient supply of labor in the
rural areas. Finally the problem became quite serious in the late
6 0's. At the same time, most of labor force flowing into the
industrial sector were young and productive. Gradually, the
average age of the labor force became lower and lower. Toward the
end of 60's, the situation became worse. The farmers had to hire
large amounts of expensive laborers from outside the rural areas
for each cultivation and harvest season. This not only increased
the'cost of production, but also reduced the productivity of the
agricultural sector.
-104-
c. Agriculture
The agricultural sector played a very important role
during the U.S. Aid period. Unfortunately, after the implemen-
tation of the "Land Reform" policy, the government did not carry
out further steps to assist the growth of the agricultural sector.
On the contrary, the agricultural sector has been stymied under
the government development policy, specially after 1965, when
the mainstream of Taiwan's development policy was on export
industries. Agriculture dropped to a subordinate position. The
factors which changed the agricultural position in the past 24
years are as follows:
(1) In order to maintain price stability, food price had
been kept to a minimum by the government ( also, to maintain
cheap wage costs for foreign investment industries ) despite the
severe inflation vaused by rapid industrialization and increasing
cost of other industrial products and commodities. Gradually,
farmers had to find non-farm jobs to supplement their minimum
standard of living. According to official government data, the
percentage of full-time farmers to that of total farmers fropped
from 47.6% in 1960 to 31.9% in 1965 down to 27.6% in 1970. The
percentage full-time farmers who had to find some non-farm job
as the major source of income had increased from 22.5% in 1960
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to 27.1% in 1965 up to 30.3% in 1970.
(2) The government's policy of heavy direct and indirect
taxes, and monopolization of fertilizer, caused the increased
cost of production. Direct and indirect taxes included the farm
tax, license tax, farm house defence tax, business tax, and
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income tax etc. According to statistics of the Foodstuff Bureau
in 1969, the index of farm tax increased from 100 in 1946 to 160
in 1950, to 219 in 1962, to 298 in 1967, to 305 in 1968. But
during the same period the crop production only increased from
100 in 1946 to 116 in 1950, to 151 in 1962, to 194 in 1967, to
201 in 1968. Moreover, from 1971 to 1975, farm tax increased
2280% more.
The high cost of fertilizer under the government's policy
of monopolization is another heavy burden on farmers. Fertilizer
production is monopolized by a semi-public institution. For
example, in 1969, the selling price of urea fertilizer from the
factory to the Foodstuff Bureau of the central government was
U.S. $110 per ton. The sales price of the Foodstuff Bureau to the
market was U.S. $145 per ton. But according to government policy,
farmers must pay each ton of urea fertilizer with crops which
cost almost U.S. $165. ( 1969,2,23 "Central Daily News" ) This
policy had lasted for 21 years and was finally canceled in 1972.
But the market price of fertilizer under the control of Foodstuff
Bureau remained high.
The increasing burden of production cost to the farmers
could not be relieved by raising the price of products due to
severe government control of food prices. Gradually, farmers
became short of capital to seeds, fertilizer, and farm implements.
They have to pay high interest plus land mortage in order to
borrow money. This led to over 85% of farmers having personal
debts as high as up to three or four years total income ( 1970,
8 "SUJCRR report" ). As a result, the out-migration of rural
youth into urban areas proceeded more and more rapidly. The
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agricultural population dropped from 45% in 1969 to 40% in 1973
and down to 30% in 1975 in relation to the employed population23
Major agricultural products like rice, sweet potato, sugar cane,
soy beans, corn and peanuts all decreased in production since
1968, although the unit yields increased. The average annual
growth rate of agriculture was around 5.2% during 1953 -1968,
2.2% during 1969 -1972, 0.8% during 1973 -1974, and -2.2%
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during 1974 -1975.
Overall, farmers did not receive an equitable share of the
benefits of development. The rural sector has a relatively low
per capita income, U.S. $224 in 1973 and U.S.$315 in 1974 as com-
pared to the national per capita income of U.S.$489 in 1973 and
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U.S.$700 in 1974. Furthermore, farmer's real income has been
decreasing ( by deducting the inflated value ). Some of them
can not even afford to till their own land, and are forced to
sublet or sell the land to others. However, buyers are few
because the income and profit from agricultural production is
too low. Thus, the agricultural sector was secrificed under
the development policy of the export-development period.
d. Industry
Foreign investment increased more than 5 times in 1960
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compared to average annual investment figure for the 1950's,
because of governmental policy in the Promulgation of the Statute
for Encourgement of Investment. In 1965 ( the end year of the
U.S. Aid period ), the first export processing zone was estab-
lished in Kao-shung by the government. More incentive for
investment were publiched especially on the development of
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industry in the export processing z.one. Foreign investment
investment increased more rapidly than ever. For instance, the
total amount of foreign investment within the period of 1952-1964
was U.S.$93,106,000, foreign investment in 1965 was U.S. $
162,956,000 in 1971, and U.S.$ 248,854,000 in 1973 ( Statistic
in report of foreign investment of Bureau of Internation Trade,
Executive Yuan ). Foreign-financed factories and industries
increased with incredible speed following the spreading of
export processing zones. Industrial development showed a great
prosperity within the period of 1965-1973. But the most import-
ant incentive for foreign investment remains the cheap labor
force in Taiwan.
The article "U.S. Investment in Taiwan Up Substantially in
1970" (published in "Commerce Today" 8,9, 1971 ) listed many
beneficial conditions for foreign investment on Taiwan. These
included the stability of the social, political, and currency
situation, cheap construction of factories, cheap and sufficient
supply of electric power and convenient transportation facilities
such as highway, railroad, airport, and harbor. Most of all, it
emphasized the cheapness and quality of the labor force in Taiwan.
Within an advertising booklet titled "Investor's Guide, Export
Processing Zone in the Republic of China" publiched by the mana-
gement department of export processing zones in 1973,1,1, cheap
labor was stressed as the most important advantage to foreign
investors. It also presented the general wage level for workers
in 1972. According to the Labor Act, the minimum monthly wage for
workers is U.S.$15. Working hours amount to eight hours per day
-108-
and six days per week. The average wage were as follows: for
non-skilled male worker, the wage range was U.S.$22.5 - U.S.$35.
monthly; For non-skilled female worker, the wage range was
U.S.$20 - U.S.$30 monthly; For skilled male workers the range
was U.S.$42.5 - U.S.$60 monthly, and the range for female workers
was U.S.$35 - U.S.$50 monthly. Average wages for general labor
was U.S.$502 annually, equal to one-sixteenth of general labor
wages in the U.S., two-third of Hong Kong's general labor wage,
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and less than one-third of Japanese labor wage. Moreover, in
Taiwan, there is no labor legislation concerned with the
physical working environment and security facilities of the
factories. Under this kind of incentive, after 1965, most of the
foreign invested industries belonged to the labor-intensive
type.
The Kao-shung Export Processing Zone, which was established
in 1965, is a very good example in illustrating the situation of
industriai development in Taiwan after 1965, it contained 126
factories which included textile, metal plastic production,
handicraft, cloth, leather and electric appliance and electronic
industries. Within the period of 1966-1969, total investment for
the industries is U.S.$28.25 million. National capital occupied
only 14.4% of the total investment. The 85.6% came from foreign
investment. For most of the industrial production in Kao-Shung
Export Processing Zone, foreign investors imported large amount
of raw materials, semi-finished products and technology, processed
in the factories through assembly lines. Therefore, in 1969, the
total cost of production in the zone was U.S.$70.25 million,
61.8% (U.S.$43.5 million ) of which belonged to the import of
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goods and technology. 23.1 of the total (U.S.$16.25 million )
belonged to net productive income and machinery depreciation.
Excluding the depreciation, net productive income was U.S.$15
million. Within this net productive income, the foreigner's
income ( including wage income, property income ) occupied 6.5%
and the foreign profit occupied 31.5%. ( this is the average
profit. The profit of some production, such as electronic indus-
tries was higher than 50% of net productive income ). Out of the
total revenue of industrial production in Kao-Shung Export
Processing Zone in 1969, only 28% (U.S.$19.5 million ) belonged
to domestic net income ( Net income of domestic production U.S.
$9 million + domestic expenses U.S.$10.5 million ). The detailed
figure are shown in table. In terms of the total domestic income
of production for Kao-Shung Export Processing Zone in 1969, labor
income was less than 8 million (53-3%). The total number of
employees was 29,399 over 87% of which were female workers. The
average income of an employee then was only U.S.$269 annually.
According to the analysis above, we can see that Taiwan's
industrial development during the period of 1965-1973 was still
at the stage of labor-intensive production. After 1965, two more
large-scale industrial zones were established at Nantze ( Southern
Taiwan ) and Taichung ( Central Taiwan ). These three zones, in
1974, had 292 plants with 68,000 workers, of which 85% are females.
Not all foreign financed industries are in export processing zone.
Some of them are located in the suburbs of large cities. The
major industries which were developed during this period included
textiles, electric appliances and electronic equipments, tourism,
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automobile, food processing, fertilizer, chemistry, and timber.
The availability of foreign investment greatly aided in the
development of these industries.
e. Urbanization and Change of Social Structure
During this period, the development emphasis of governmental
policy was placed on industrialization and expansion of trade
economy. Many benefits were given to the industrial and trading
sectors. At the same time, the agricultural sector was being
squeezed due to disincentives, such as the control of product
price and a heavy tax. After 1968, the differential between two
sectors became more and more pronounced. Industrial development
and trade expansion resulted in a large increase in number of
factories and companies. Most of these were concentrated in
several large urban areas. For example, in 1972, Taipei, the
capital city, had 37,014 registered companies, which represented
50.6% of total registered companies in Taiwan in that year. The
capital for the companies in Taipei equals 56% of the total
capital for all companies in Taiwan. The booming development of
the urban sector increased the pace of urbanization. Within the
period of 1965-1973, the annual increase of urban population was
over 30% of the total. ("Urbanization and Population in Taiwan"
1974,4, Economic Review ). Most of these increasing population
were urban migrants coming from the deteriorating rural sector,
and most of them were unskilled laborers. Toward the end of 1972,
this class of population occupied over 70% of the total urban
population. Their wages were far below the general social stand-
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ard, and their livelihood did not show much improvement compared
to that what they had had in the rural countryside. Labor insur-
ance policy covers only a small part of this class. Most of the
factories lack any security system to protect the workers from
accidents.
After 1965, a new social minority -- the middle income class
began to emerge in the urban sector following the rapid develop-
ment of industries and trading businesses. Most of them came
from the young intellectural group of 50's. They had better edu-
cational backgrounds than the social majority. Following indus-
trialization and trade expansion, the demand for management
talent and professionals increased. Most members of this class.
entered either into private industries or public enterprises to
serve in management and technical departments. According to
official statistics in 1970, the graduates of colleges and
professional institutes occupied 12.11% of the total employed
population.
f. Housing Development
(i) Housing Problems
After 1965 -- the beginning of the export-economy
development period, urbanization progressed more rapidly than
before. Housing rents and land prices in urban areas also incr-
eased rapidly following the increase in urbanization.
The expensive rent and housing prices forced the emerging
urban imgrants into small, overcrowded, and inadequate living
conditions within the urban area. Many older communities began
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to deteriorate under this situation and became slums. By the
beginning of the 70's, problems of overcrowded living conditions,
insufficient supply of public facilities, bad sanitation, became
serious not only for the urban destitutes but also the majority
of general middle and low-income families. According to official
statistics published in the "General Survey of Housing Conditions
in Taiwan" in 1970, average living space for each family was
474 sqft, with each person only occupying 88.18 sqft of living
space. 14.4% have no toilets at all. 41% of the total housing
space was occupied by the families with living space less than
357 sqft. For the low-income residents who lived in .four-story
apartment units, each member typically only occupied 21.42 sqft.
Within this period, housing problems in Taiwan's urban area
were no longer limited to housing shortages. The booming deve-
lopment of processing industries and trading business increased
the gap between rich and poor in Taiwan society. This differen-
tiation also appeared on urban housing problems. After 1965,
within the large amount of inflow of foreign capital, large
portions of overseas Chinese capital went into the land specu-
lation and real-estate business. At the same time, the govern-
ment published some acts for the encouragement of housing con-
struction ( detail will be discussed later ). Under these condi-
tions, many real-estate and housing construction comapnies were
established. Some large companies set up their own departments
of market surveys, land purchasing, architectural design, adver-
tisement, building construction and sales. Usually, these compa-
nies cooperated with the land speculators who possessed large
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amount of capital and.operated large scale businesses of urban
land speculation. They constructed the high-class suburban resi-
dential areas and luxury high-rise apartments in order to meet
the demands of the national bourgeoisie class. They also construc-
ted modern high-rise office building in the downtown area, and
some of the housing units for the emerging class of middle and
upper-income families. The gap in living conditions between the
upper and lower strata was becoming increasingly evident. Some
of the luxury apartments in downtown areas possessed twenty rooms
with more than 5000 sqft of living space.
The profits in land speculation and real-estate business
caused rapid price increases in general urban land and housing
and uneven distribution of urban land ownership. These posed
two major problems for housing development in urban areas,
according to government data of urban land price, within the
period of 1965-1973, the price of urban land increased more than
seven times in average. This increasing rate is vastly out of
proportion to that of average wages, especially that of the
urban working class. According to U.N. statistics on "comparison
58 of housing purchasing ability of workers in different nations"
in 1968, the price of a small dwelling with reasonable minimum
space (640 sqft) is equal to eight times a worker's average
annual income. In Japan, it is 3.5 times. This figure has in-
creased 10 times in 1973 in Taiwan. The price of urban housing
increased more rapidly than inflation caused by industrialization.
It became increasingly impossible for the urban majority-middle
and low income residents and workers to buy or rent a shelter.
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Land speculation is a very important factor in the price increase
of urban land and housing. The land speculators earned their tre-
mandous profit simply by buying large pieces of urban land, wait-
ing for a short period and selling off to others. Gradually, more
and more domestic capital and overseas Chinese capital went into
the business of land speculation instead of investing in produc-
tive businesses, especially during the period of inflation.
Following the boom in land speculation urban land began to be
concentrated in the hands of a small group of so-called "urban
landlords". For example, according to the statistics of the
Taipei municipal government in 1973, the total area of Taipei's
land is 53,468 acres, and it is owned by 143,646 landlords.
Within these landlords, 32% of the total landlords ( 4,741 )
controlled 32,783 acres of land, and this small group of land-
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lords only occupied 0.26% of the total population in Taipei city.
On average, each of these landlords occupied almost 7 acres of
land. But, meanwhile, for the urban majority -- the workers and
the low-income class, each person had 21.42 sqft of living
space. During the beginning of 70's, the rapid increase in urban
land prices caused by urbanization and land speculation and the
uneven distribution of urban land ownership became the major
obstacles for construction of large-scale public housing in
order to solve the urban nightmare of housing crisis.
(ii) Comprehensive Planning Institute For Islandwide Urban
And Housing Development
Generally speaking, during the U.S. Aid period, the
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emphasis of government policy and U.S. Aid programs for urban
and housing development was placed upon the solution of emergency
and short-term problems. Most of the planning work concerned with
long-term urban and housing development was put under the aegis
of the local governments. But with the shortage of finance, man.
power and technology, the local government could not accomplish
much in term of lang-term planning work. At the same time, con-
tinuous industrialization and rapid urbanization changed the
economic and social structure. Because of the rapidity of such
change, all the past housing policies, such as encouragement of
housing investment, implementation of public housing construction
and the elimination of slums and squatters were inadequate to
deal with emerging urban and housing problems. In 1965, the
government applied for special assistance from the U.N. for
urban and housing development programs. In April, 1966, with the
assistance of 11 U.N. experts, the government established a new
institute -- Urban And Housing Development Committee (UHDC)
which was under the direct authority of CIECD, Executive Yuan.
The major goal for the establishment of UHDC was to initiate a
long-term urban and housing development plan in relation to
islandwide economic development and the process of urbanization.
In drder to achieve this goal, the major missions of UHDC in-
cl uded the initiation of long-term urban and housing development
plans, the initiation of the urban and housing act, the establi-
shment of a survey and analysis system for housing development
data and the study of new town development. UHDC was abolished
in 1971. During the period of 1966-1971, several important plan-
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ning projects were implemented under the authority of UHDC, which
included Regional Planning for Northern, Middle and Southern
Taiwan, General Planning for Metropolitan Taipei, Planning for
Linkou New Town etc. At the same time, under the assistance of
UHDC, the Public Contruction Bureau of the Taiwan provincial
government organized an urban planning team in charge of planning
projects for local towns and cities in 1970. After 1971, a new
planning organization -- the Department of Urban Development
(DHD) was established under CIECD in order to take over all the
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planning affairs of UHDC.
(iii) Housing Development Policy and Housing Contruction
During the period of UHDC, the basic framework for
housing development policy was established according to a study
report of U.N. expert Donald Monson. Within the report Monson
declared that the major responsibility for public housing
development for low-income population should be with the govern-
ment. The emphasis of general housing development policy,
however, should be placed on the encouragement of investment in
large-scale housing construction in order to meet the needs of
the emerging middle class which was expanding rapidly. Under this
concept, the major achievement of UHDC are as follows:
(1) the drafting of the housing act. UHDC considered it
necessary to establish a complete and systematic housing act
which could provide general guidance for long-term housing
development. The housing act drafted by UHDC in 1970 included
general principles, housing capital, housing loan, site,
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construction standard, encouragement of housing construction,
encouragement of production for standard housing construction
materials, public housing, community construction, protection of
housing ownership and housing management. This draft was submitted
to the Executive Yuan in 1970.
(2) The planning for housing construction within the fifth
four-year economic development period. Within this project, UHDC
presented the idea that housing development should be integrated
with regional development in order to create a bettwe living
environment. UEDC also estimated that the demand for public
housing within this period to be 197,200 units. This figure was
estimated according to data analysis on population growth, urban-
ization process, the need for housing reconstruction after damage
within past several years, and the reconstruction of some slums
areas and squatters. But this project was not implemented by
the government, due to capital shortage.
(3) The estimate of housing demand within 20 years and the
planning for long-term housing construction. The major goal of
this project was to establish a long-term ( 20 years ) housing
construction plan in order to relieve the pressure of the urban
housing crisis. According to the estimate, during the period of
1969-1988 housing demand in Taiwan reached 3,043,310 units,
within which 2,081,810 units were to be urban housing. In other
words, the average demand for urban housing was about 100,000
units annually. The long-term housing construction plan was ini-
tiated according to the estimates of the changing needs, diff-
erent types of families, studies on the relationship between
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housing investment and GNP, and inflation indices within the 20
year period. The major focus of this project was on middle-
income families. The long-term plan for this project was presented
by Monson as follows.
(4) Issuing housing bonds. Monson suggested in this project
that the capital could be accumulated by issuing long-term ( 20
years ) incentive housing bonds. The annual interest was to be
11%. Incentives could include the government's guarantee of pro-
fit and interest for the bond, free income tax policy etc. The
focus of housing construction was to be on middle-income families
defined as those with a monthly income range of NT$3,000 to NT$
5,000 ( 1969 ). The basic requirements for eligibility was 10%
down payment of the total price of land and dwelling. The rest
was to be paid by a 20-year installment plan. Each monthly pay-
ment was about 20% of the applicant's income. Monson estimated
that this project would begin with the construction of 21,000
housing units annually during the initial period, increasing to
80,000 units per year by the last period of this long term pro-
ject. This project, however, has not been implemented due to too
many practical problems.
After 1971, DUD discontinued UHDC's efforts in researching
housing problems. Most of UHDC's projects remained at the stage
of proposals. The only existing legislation concerned with
housing development remains the RMPHC, publiched in 1959. During
the period of 1967-1975, the government constructed 56,221 units
( 25.4% of the total ). But during this period, private invest-
ment in housing construction and land speculation became more
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and more prosperous, resulting in approzimately 40,000 housing
units built annually, part of which was in the suburbs. Most of
these housing units belonged to the middle and upper-income class.
Luxury high-rise apartments were also errected in the cities. But
at the same time, slum areas and squatters spread all over the
urban areas. The overcrowded living situatbn in these areas
became more and more pronounced,and sanitation especially became
a serious issue. A large percentage of urban, social, and crimi-
nal problems arose in these areas. By the early 1970's, the
government's policy of eliminating slum areas and squatters had
29become virtually ineffective.
-120-
D. Conclusion: The Development Period of Energy Crisis and
Worldwide Inflation
a. The Change of Development Environment
Taiwan's development was heavily dependent on foreign trade
after the 1960 due to governmental policy which encouraged large
amounts of imported foreign capital. The result of trade-oriented
development had deeply affected the domestic economy, especially
during the energy crisis and the international upheaval caused
by recession and inflation during the years of late 1973 and
1974. After 1974 many nations began to implement series of
protectionist measures to guard the development of domestic
industries and manufacturing business , and the worldwide consump-
tive force declines. Concurrently, following the continued
increase of energy costs, the price of raw materials ( produced
mostly by third world countries ) also began to spiral upward.
All of the aforementioned factors increased the cost of manufac-
turing goods and brought about serious inflation to the tiny'
island of Taiwan. During 1974, inflation rate was around 50%.
With whole sale and retail prices up 60% compared with 23% in
1973. Commodity prices rose to 47.5%. Annual whole sale price
maintained only 2% - 3% growth rate in the last ten years.
Taiwan's trade volume recorded a deficit of U.S.$1,326 million
in 1974 ( the highest ever ) after surplus of previous three
years. The deficit in 1974 was almost equal to the total surplus
of past three years combined. In 1974, Taiwan's inflow of foreign
capital was down one-third or to U.S.$59.4 million (U.S. capital
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was down 57.9%, Japanese capital was down 39.5% ) in comparison
with 1973. In 1975, a reduction of U.S.$71 million or 37.5% com-
pared with 1974. A decrease of U.S.$130.4 million or 52.6% of
the total foreign capital was registered from 1973 to 1975. In
order to overcome economic stagnation, Taiwan's Legislative
Yuan passed a revised State for the Encouragement of Investment
to reduce income tax burden on foreign enterprises from 35% to
30-20% in 1975. In addition to tax deduction, the central govern-
ment heaped favors on foreign investors. A note worthy phenomenon
should be that some of the foreign capital were not productive
in the investment field but rather the inflow was only for pur-
poses of Taiwan's fiscal transactions, and foreign investors
were to gain tremendous interests therefrom. ( Detail will be
discussed in "The Ten Construction Project" )
On February 19, 1976, the Economic Planning Council announced
that the Six 4-year Economic Development Plan ( 1973-1976 ) was
cancelled as targets were too unrealistic to be achieved. A new
6-year Economic Plan ( 1976-1981 ) was proposed, in which all
the targets were scaled down by a third. The main thrust of the
new plan is on the Ten Construction Project alter the fundamental
framework of Taiwan's development.
b. The Crisis of Industry
During 1974, industrial production declined and fell over
30%. Firms and factories especially in textile, plywood and metal
industries were forced to either lay off employees or face shut
down. (because they relied heavily on import of raw materials)
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The firms closed down at a rate of 20%-50% as a result of excess
inventions and depressed demand.
In fact, because of the government's policy of encouragement
of foreign investment, most of the large-scale leading private
industries and factories were monopolized by the foreign invest-
ors, with the exceptions of textile and plywood industries. Most
of the domestic industries and factories were unable to compete
with foreign investment due to the lack of capital and market
and remained at the small and medium range. These small and
medium industries lacked sufficient capital and were compelled
to depend on interest, short-term private loan to maintain pro-
duction expenses. After 1974, the situation of these industries
become acute. According to the survey released by Taiwan's
Industrial Bureau, in 1976, 95% of the factories and manufactur-
ing enterprises were small and medium-sized with capital less
than NT$5 million and with less than 100 employees. These fac-
tories encompassed 75% of the total industrial employee popula-
tion. After 1975, those factories with serioud financial isolvancy
had to operate under heavy debts (the amount of debts was over
three to five times their actual investment) and occupied 75% of
the total. The interest of usury from private resources was
arround 36% annually. (Sept. 21, 1976, "China Daily News"). For
the small and medium size enterprises, most of heavy debts were
from the underground usury. During 1976, over half of the small
and medium firms were at the edge of bankruptcy.
c. The Crisis of Agriculture
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After 1970, the differentiation between agricultural and
industrial sector became more and more pronounced. The cost of
production in the agricultural sector increased 100% and the farm
taz leaped 80% during the period of 1971-1975. According to the
report of SUJCRR, the income of a farmer's family with less than
1 hectare's land can not pay for their minimum living expanses,
and over two third of farm families had less than 1 hectare of
land. Therefore, more and more farmers abandoned their land and
migrated to urban sectors. During the late 1974, there were over
one hundred thousands cha's farm land abandoned. Facing the
issue of farmer bankruptcy and abandonment of rural areas, the
central government approved U.S.$52.5 million for accelerating
agricultural and rural development in Taiwan. This program
included: (1) strengthening of rural infra-structure (45% of the
total budget), (2) establishment of specialized agricultural
production area (30%), (3)extension of integrated use of im-
proved cultural techniques (10%), (4) strengthening of agricul-
tural research and extension (9%), (5) improvement of agricul-
tural marketing and the establishment of industrial plants in
rural areas (6%) (China Yearbook 1975,p.191). Moreover, in 1975.
the Executive Yuan proposed the remedial measure for rural recon-
struction, which included an additional U.S.$50 million allocated
on different projects: (1) to reduce the production cost by
lowering prices of fertilizers and farm machines; to maintain
stable agricultural prices. (2) to expand the scale of farm
operations and improve their services. (3) to improve agricultural
marketing and reduce the cost of marketing services. (4) to
improve the agricultural financing system and provide an ade-
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quate supply of long-term, low interest loans to farmers (China
Time, December 12, 1975)
However, agricultural production did not witnessed any
significant improvement nor was living standard of farmers ele-
vated in spite of these programs. The growth rate of agricultural
production was 3.6% in 1973, 0.8% in 1974, and -2.2% in 1975.
Actually, after 1970, the agricultural production was no longer
able to meet supply domestic needs and the situation deteriorated
sharply. According to Taiwan's United Daily News of February 7,
1976, it disclosed: Foodstuff imports totaled 3,050,000 metric
tons in 1975 -- including wheat 540,000 metric tons, soybeans
870,000 metric tons, corn 1,640,000 metric tons. And for the
first quater of 1976, the Agricultural Department released the
following import statistic: wheat 354,800 metric tons, barley
917,0000 metric tons, corn 384,7000barrel. There are also 129,4000
metric tons of corn, 181,400 metric tons of soybeans and 179,600
barrel of cotton on the way. The figures revealed that the crisis
in the agricultural sector had caused a serious foodstuff short-
age for Taiwan in recent years. The governmental policies which
caused the deterioration of agricultural sector -- the low price
control of agricultural products and the heavy direct and in-
direct tax made any increase of agricultural production unlikely,
and the total bankruptcy of agricultural sector is unavoidable.
d. The Ten Construction Projects
The ten Construction Projects were initiated during the
period of the Sixth Four-year Economic Development Plan (1973-
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1976). The purpose of these projects was to broaden the industrial
base. The government believed that the accomplishment of these
projects would expedite Taiwan's development. The Ten Construct-
ion Projects include the North-South Expressway, Railroad Elec-
trification, Northlink Railway, Taoyuan International Airport,
Nuclear Power Plants, Petrochemical Industries, Taichung Harbor,
Kaohsiung Shipyard, Suao Port, and Integrated Steel Mills. World-
wide inflation after 1973 doubled or even tripled the cost of
each project, causing the government to face a serious financial
problem. The construction projects are still continuing and are
the emphasis of the new Six-year Economic Development Plan,
primarily because the government believes that these projects
can provide jobs, stimulate foreign investment and promote
economic growth during the period of recession. According to
official reports, the capital, equipment and technology needed
in the Ten Projects are to be imported from U.S. and Japan.
Taiwan had no means to finance these huge investments at the
present time, (Half of the capital was borrowed from abroad, 35%
borrowed from local financial institutes). Interest is 8-10%
annually, and it is estimated that over one-third of the total
annual tax revenues in 1976 will go into payment of interest.
Announcements of foreign debts in newspapers in 1976 include:
(1) the Export-Import Bank of U.S. loaned U.S.$4.4million
to China Petroleum Corp. (a public monopoly enterprise) to deve-
lop the petrochemical industry.
(2) Chemical Bank lent U.S.$6 million to China Steel Co.
(public enterprise) to build an integrated operation system.
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(3) Chemical Bank lent U.S.$ 100 million to the Ten Construc-
tion Projects.
(4) The Export-Import Bank of U.S. announced a US$ 200
million loan to China Steel Co.
(5) The Export-Import Bank of U.S. loaned US$ 500 million
to new Nuclear Power Plant.
(6) The Export-Import Bank of U.S. loaned first US$ 637
million and then US$ 934 million to the Ten Construction Projects.
(7) Continental Bank announced a US$ 200 million loan to
China Steel Co.
(8) Totonto Dominion Bank of Canada announced a US$ 5
million loan for a guarantee reserve of other loans.
All the loans were provided to purchase U. S. goods and
services needed in the projects. It is estimated that govern-
ment debts reached US$9.3 billion in 1974, US$ 15 billion in 1975,
and US$ 30 billion in 1976. In March, 1977, the Legislative Yuan
revised its legislation in limiting the maximum amount of govern-
ment foreign loan. The limitation was raised from a maximum of
US$30 billion to US$45 billion in 1977. It is difficult to see
how the Taiwan economy can support its mounting debts on interest
payments, and terms payments from the Ten Construction Projects
especially during a period of inflation. It would appear that
development would be delayed by overwhelming foreign debts30
e. The Crisis of Social Change
The impact of world-wide inflation and economic recession
in 1974, not only influenced Taiwan's development but also its
-127-
social structure. First of all, unemployment increased rapidly,
due to the bankruptcy of large numbers of medium and small enter-
prises. The unemployment rate increased from 7.6% in 1973 to 38%
in 1976. According to the survey report of the Institute of Labor
Force Research and Survey, published in February 1976, total
population is about 16 million, and the employed population is
5,557,000. The employed population in the agricultural sector
occupied 1,679,000 (31% of total), industrial sector occupied
1,962,000 (35% of total), and the service sector occupied
1,916,000 (34-% of total) But the unemployed potential labor
force occupied 3,375,000. Moreover, there will be 150,000 -
200,000 more young persons joining the labor force annually in
the near future. The government stated that the implementation
of the Ten Construction Projects can absorb part of the unemployed
labor force and reduced the unemployment rate. But most job
vacancies on the Ten Construction Projects were for skillful
labor. It was estimated in 1976 that only 15% of the total un-
employed labor force was skilled. Toward the latter part of 1976,
some of the unemployed population began to flow back in rural
sectors. Most of the unemployed population, however, stayed in
urban sectors and formed a new strata that may be termed the
urban proletariat. It was the rapid increase of this new sector
of the population that led to increasingly serious social problems.
Following the emerging of urban proletariat class, the widening
gap in the society became more and more obvious. Within this
period, small number of entrepreneurs through the assistance of
government and foreign investors developed dominant influence in
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both domestic markets and trade businesses. The bankruptcy of
large numbers of medium and small enterprises led to the monopo-
lization of several large enterprises. Through incraesing con-
centration of various industries and the imperfections of
market forces, the impact of inflation was shifted disproportion-
ately to the consumers, causing a further and widening gap between
the rich and poor. This uneven distribution of income can be seen
as the root of what has been called "the crisis of social changes",
manifested in the spiralling of various social problems and
dramatic increase in crime rate.
f. The Crisis of Housing Development
The 1973 worldwide inflation and economic recession had the
effect of stimulating the development of land speculation and
real-estate business. The energy crisis and inflation caused the
devaluation of U.S. and Taiwan's currency causing domestic whole-
sale price to increase 64.25% annually, and the rate of currency
supply in the domestic market to increase 52% annually. Large
amounts of capital was transferred from productive business into
land speculation and real estate business in order to protect
property value from devaluation. This also promoted the booming
development of private housing construction and the related
industries. Large amounts of luxurious apartments and upper and
middle income dwellings were errected around urban areas. Land
price increased three times and the rent doubled in general
during the period of 1973-1975. Moreover, the price of materials
for housing construction tripled. After 1975, the economic re-
cession discouraged the increase of land and housing prices. But
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prices had already far exceeded the reach of middle and low
income majorities. The gap between the housing need and housing
supply became larger.
During this period, one of the most important large scale
public housing project was Linkou New Toan. This project had been
planned by UHDC since 1971. The major emphasis of this project
was the development of an industrial zone, with middle and low-
income and working class housing. The favorable conditions for
the development of Linkou New Town include Linkou's physical
locality being very suitable as a satellite town for the Taipei
metropolitan area, and providing a release for the pressure of
urbanization on the Taipei metropolitan areas. Moreover, the
most important factor is that the land price around Linkou area
is very cheap and the land accumulation for development is easy.
But during the process of planning, some big land speculators
and brokers colluded with government bureaucrats and bought up
most of the important land of the Linkuo Project. After the
government decided to implement this project in 1973, land price
around Linkou area rose 10 times. Finally, the project had to
be cancelled in 1974.
During this period, the government investment in public
housing construction was very meagre. On the average, there were
only 2,000 public housing units constructed annually, and in
1975, there were only 135 public housing units constructed in the
Taipei metropolitan area (the largest urban area in Taiwan) within
which low-income housing only occupied 90-units. The problems of
housing shortage, slums and squatters became increasingly serious.
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In 1975, a series of announcement by the Executive Yuan
declared that public housing construction had become top priority
for government policy, and the Executive Yuan has made the final
decision to implement immediately public housing constructions.
The implementation will increase job opportunities- and promote-
the development of related industries. All the problems concerned
with the implementation such as land acquisition and capital
accumulation have been studied by government and should be
resolved shortly. In February 27, 1976, the Executive Yuan
announced that the public housing construction has been integra-
ted with the new Six-year Economic Development Plan and there
should be 220,000 units of public housing to be constructed
within this six year period. But till now, all the projects are
still at the stage of proposals. There is no evidence to prove
that the government can afford to implement a project with such
great investment needs. A revision of RMPHC was published in 1975,
within this revision, the government did not propose a practical
solution to the problems of large-scale public housing construc-
tion. Instead, according to the regulation the government expected
the problem of housing shortage for the majority of middle and
low income residents to bo solved by encouraging the development
of private investment in the construction business. According
to the history of housing development in the past 27 years, the
crisis of housing development can not be solved, if the govern-
ment continues to depend on private investment, land speculation
and real estate business to be influential factors in large-scale
housing construction for middle and low-income and working class
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residents. According to the report "A Study of Public Housing
Policy, Bureau of Domestic Affairs" in June 1976, only 40fo of
Middle and low income families can afford to buy a dwelling with
minimum standard of living space and facilities under the exist-
ing long-term (20 years) installment plans. The cost of these
dwellings must not include any profit. The housing crisis only
31
can be solved by major public efforts.
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A. Introduction: Political Economy As A Basis of Critique
a. The Essence of Development
The concept " development " which came into being during the
early twentieth century included two important aspects: (1) the
renovation of technology and economy (2) the renovation of
politics and society. This concept of development stressed social
welfare rather than the increasing of property. Development of
technology can promote industrialization, and industrialization is
the necessary process to lead society into the stage of comprehen-
sive welfare system. Therefore, industrialization within develop-
ing countries should be considered a process of modernization,
rather than a process of development.
Since 1950, however, the essence of development has been
restricted to a much narrower sense -- the progress of technical
and economic activities within the capitalist system. The inte-
gration and interrelationship between politics, economics, and
technology has been ignored. Therefore, the term " development
became synonymous with, " economic development " and " economic
growth ". The pursuit of economic growth within the capitalist
system usually meant measurement by increase of GNP or per capita
income. But no positive relation has been found to exist between
the rapid increase of GNP or per capita income and the " develop-
ment " of the whole society. The experience of many underdeveloped
countries within the recent twenty years shows that the increase in
GNP or per capita income has not resolved many economic, political
and social problems. The accumulation of capital and property has
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not reduced the differential gap between the rich and the poor;
increasing consumption has not contributed to overall welfare, and
the continuous growth of the economy has not brought the Third
World into the ranks of the industrialized. On the contrary,
social, economic and political probelms have become more numerous
and the differential gap between the rich and poor larger.
The original concept of capitalism is the application of
universal principle of free competition in human society. This
principal has been practiced within the exchange system of the
society market. The capital is the driving force of market system.
Within the market system, everything is labeled with certain price
(including labor) can be exchanged. The more capital one possess-
es, the more merchandises one can exchange from the market. The
accumulation of merchandises and capital represents the increase
of property. Therefore, the emphasis of capitalist economists on
the study of operation of market and accumulation of capital.
Within their theory, development means the accumulation of
economic property, and the process of accumulation necessarily
entails the emphasis of material values. The more human values
the problems of distribution and the goal and essence of integrat-
ed development, the change of social relation, and the development
of individual potentials during the process of development had
been unjustly neglected.
The major concern of " development " should be a" the human
being ". The purpose of " development " is the development
should be a " integrated social progress " and include economic
progress, social relation and politics.
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b. The Theory of Political Economy
The following critisism for " dependency " theory and the
development experience in Taiwan is based on Marx's theory of
political economy. Marx's political economy is a method for the
study of the relationships of production. According to the basic
concept of Marx's political economy, the social relation of
production is the fundamental relation which determined all the
other human relations in the society. Because of the necessity of
social production, men entered into certain social relation of
production which is determined by the existing social force of
production at the given stage. All the social relations of
production constituted economic fundation of the society. Based
on this social fundation, the corresponding superstructure
includes the reins of government, army, law and social ideology.
The total social relation of production and the social force of
production, as well as the economic fundation and the social
superstructures. Marx's political economy emphasized the study
of contradictions between the relation of production and the force
of product. The contradictions between the superstructures and
the economic fundations, and the objective interdiciplanary of
development of human society. The major difference between the
Marx's political economy and the capitalist economy is that
capitalist economy treats the economic relation in the society
as the relations between materials ( for example, the relations
of market, capital accumulation, or merchandise etc. ); under
this basic attitude, the relation of exploitation within capitalism
society has been ignored, this is the basic problem of capitalism
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society. Marx's political economy emphasized the social relations
between men and men during the study of social and exonomic
structure instead of relations between materials and materials.
Therefore, Marx's political economy explored the major contradic-
tion of capitalist society as between classes rather than between
materials. Marx described the basic theory of political economy
as follows: " In the social production which men carry on they
enter into definite relation that are indispensable and independ-
ent of their will; these relations of production correspond to a
definited stage of development of their material power of produc-
tion. The sum total of these relations of production constitutes
the economic structure of the society -- the real foundation,
legal and political superstructures are based and corresponds
to definite forrm of social consciousness. " At a certain stage
of their development, the material force of production in the
society will conflict with the existing relation of production.
With the advent of social revolution, with the attendant changes
of the economic foundation the entire superstructure is being
repidly transformed. ( Excerptedfrom preface of A contribution
To The Critique Of Political Economy By Karl Marx, first published
in 1859 )
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B..Critique Of The " Dependency " Theory Of Regional And Housing
Development
a. Critique of the Basic Assumption
The capitalist theory was established on a series of assump-
tion which can be summerized into three major concepts:(l)concept
of class differenciation (2) concept of the roles of state
institutions (3) concept of individual behavior.
(1) Concept of class differenciation. The capitalist
theorists consider the class differenciation exists in any given
society and the contradictions of uneven distribution of social
property among different classes is a common phenomenon. They
believed that all the contradictions among the different social
classes can be compromised because a society is organized under a
common set of ideals. The capitalists ignored the origins of the
contradictions of class dfferenciation and the true relations
among these classes. It is to be questioned whether the class
differenciation has existed from all eternity. Within a certain
stage of economic development, certain privileged classes
plundered material advantages and became the oppessing classes,
the class differenciation would appear and from which the
contradiction among the different classes arise. The true
relation among these classes according to Marx, therefore, is the
relation between the oppressor and the oppressed. Under this
relation, the contradictions can not be resolved nor compromised
unless the oppressing class is eliminated. The human history in
the Marxian mold is the history of class struggle.
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(2) Concept of the roles of state institutions. Many modern
liberal consider the state as an institutions established in the
interests of society as a whole, and for the purpose of mediating
and reconcilling the chronic antagonisms between social existance.
The weakness of this theory is that it failed to explain where
state comes from and what is the function of the state. From the
historical view point, the state is the product of a long and
arduous struggle, and the class that succeeded in occupying the
key position in the process of production fashions a state that
will enforce a set of relations which is favorable to its own
special needs and interests. When class reaps material advantages
other classes in evitably suffer material disadvantages. Within
capitalist society, " class domination " and " the protection of
private property " are virtually synonymous expressions.
(3) Concept of individual behavior. Most of capitalist
theorists believe that human nature is defective; most of the
existing social problems are caused by this defective nature of
individuals; social institutions exist to restrict the manifesta-
tion of individual defects and the social development must depend
on the behavioral change of each individual. They blame the
existing contradictions on individual defects. The fact is that
the social development does not depend on the behavioral change of
individuals but on the development of social forces of production
and the changes of relation of production in the society that are
independent of one's free will.
b. Critique on Development Preconditions
Capitalism is an economic system controlled, regulated; and
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directed by market alone; production and distribution of goods
is entrusted to this mechanism. Under this theory, it assumes
that markets in which the supply of goods ( including services )
available at a definite price will equal the demand at that price.
It further assumes the presence of capital, which functions as
purchasing power. Production is controlled by price, and the
profits goes to those who owns the capital and means of production.
The distribution of the goods will then depend on price, and price
forms incomes, and with income the goods are eventually distribut-
ed among the members of society. Accordingly, every elements of
development within a society is regarded as having been produced
for sale. In short, there must be markets for every element; and
that each element has a price, which interacts with demand and
supply. These markets are interconnected and coalesce into one
big market.
The crucial point is that labor, resources and capital are
the essential elements for development; they also must be organized
in markets; in fact, these markets form the vital part of capital-
ist system. But labor, resources and capital are not merchandise.
Labor is only another name for human activity, and is not produced
for sale, nor can such activity be detached from the rest of life,
be stored or mobilized. Resources is another name of nature which
is not produced by men; capital is merely a taken of purchasing
power which is not produced at all, but come into being through
the mechanism of banking or state finance. None of the above is
produced for sale.
The right of private ownership within capitalist system al-
lows the market mechanism to direst the fate of human being, their
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natural environment and the amount and the use of purchasing
power. This has resulted in the exploitative relation of social
production, the contradiction of unevened distribution, and the
degradation of human environment.
Profit is the primitive ideal for the development of market
under the capitalism system. The more the market system expands,
the more profit the capitalists can make. Therefore, the openning
up and monopolizing of new foreign market had become the major
mission for capitalists within developed countries. Under this
majorO intention, a series of capitalist's theories of market
capital, technology, resources and labor force ofr developing
countries have been developed to serve the capitalists interests.
Through the export of capital and technology, the advanced
capitalist states have monopolized the markets and resources of
developing countries. As a result, the relation of exploitation
among the advanced capitalist states and the developing countries.
Through these relations, the capitalist state can transfer the
unaviodable crisis of capitalism system from its own society ot
that of the developing countries. This is one of the important
reason that led Lenin to define imperialism as the highest stage
of Capitalism.
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c. Critique On Theory Of The Relation Between Agriculture And
Industry
After 1950, the capitalist theorists created the development
theory of so call " Dualism " for developing countries based on
the development experience of advanced capitalist countries. They
believed that the disequilibrated development between agricultural
and industrial sectors in the unavoidable and necessary procedure
for most developing countries during the initial period of indus-
trialization. The theorists further declare that the import: of
foreign capital and advanced technology can stimulate the devel-
opment of productive force in domestic industries; the traditional
agricultural sector should supply the industrial development with
sufficient cheap products, raw materials and cheap labors in
order to achieve rapid industrialization. The rapid development
of industrial sector can in turn lead the agricultural production
to the stage of mechanization.
In practice, within developing societies most of population
belongs to the agricultural sector, and agricultural production is
the base of any other development. The import of foreign capital
and advanced technology and establishment of foreign invested
industried can neither supply the immediate domestic demand nor
support the development of productive force of traditional
agricultural sector, but benefit the intrusion of international
capitalist market. The development experience of most developing
countries within recent twenty years has proved this points.
After openning up of domestic market to foreign capitalists, most
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-surplus value of domestic production of developing countries
transferred into the hand of those foreign bourgeoisies through
the exploitated relation of production between the foreign invest-
ors and domestic workers, and the unequal relation of trade between
the agricultural and industrial products. The primitive accumula-
tion of capital for industrialization can never be achieved.
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d. Critique On The Theory of Urbanization And Change Of Social
Structure
According to capitalism theory, urbanization is always a
product in the process of industrialization. Some capitalist
theorists even consider it as the sign of progress in the society,
especially in developing countries. But what is the real cause of
urbanization? The answer of this question lies in the antagonism
between town and country.
For the experiences of most developing countries, the import
of foreign capital and technology upset the equilibrium of tradi-
tional society between the urban and rural sector, and change the
mode of production and force of production within urban sectors.
The improved force of production and mode of production caused
the concentration of social production in urban sectors. This
concentration increased the disequilibrated development and uneven
distribution of social property between the two sectors. The
differenciated gap between urban..and rural sector widens. In the
process of development, antagonism between town and country would
surface because of economic conditions and large-scale imigration
of population from rural countryside to urban sectors.
Along with urbanization, the change of social structure
occurred in urban sector because of the change of productive force.
This change breakes out the traditional mode of relation of prouc-
tion , and a new social structure forms. This new social structure
is established on a exploitated relation of production among the
foreign capitalists, national bourgeoisis and the majority produc-
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tion class. Usually, the foreign capitalists associated with the
state power and national bourgeoisis of the developing countries
to exploit the maximum surplus value. Under the circumstances,
it becomes impossible to imagine that the developing state or
institutions can play the role of unbiased arbitrators and
implement social policy to protect welfare of the majority
proletarian class. The inequality in income distribution will
then became more and more severe, confrontation will become
equally severe. Finally this contradiction will become the major
fetter for the improvement of social force of production in
developing countries.Quite contrarary to the capitalist's theory
of the transformation of industrial production from the stage of
labor-intensive to that of capital and technique-intensive produc-
tion.
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e. Critique On The Theory Of Housing Development
The housing problem is the common crisis in all the capital-
ist societies including the most advanced capitalist nations, and
is more serious in developing countries. Most capitalist theorists
consider that the housing problem in urban area is caused by
continuous urbanization; an unavoidable phenomenon during the
process development. Therefore, the housing problem is intrinsic
to any urbanization. The problem can be resoved by the gradual
economic equalization of supply and demand, and a subsidized policy
should be implemented as part of social welfare program to solve
the housing problem for low-income classes, and new town construc-
tion also should be set up in order to release the pressure of over
urbanization for large metropolitan areas.
Neither of these policies can really be the final solution.
The housing problem will exist during the process of development.
The greatest effect that these policies can achieve is the tempora-
ry release of the housing crisis pressure for the urban environ-
ment. Housing is the major problem of capitalist regional develop-
ment strategies. As long as the inequality exists between the
urban and rural development, the oppression of agricultural sector
continues unabated. The urban housing problems will persist no
matter which kind of housing policy is undertaken.
The urban housing crisis is more serious in most developing
countries.than that of advanced capitalist nations, because the
urbanization processes more sudden. However, the capitalist
theorists insist that the solution in developing countries is still
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the same, but the emphaisis of housing development for most
developing countries should be placed on the public subsidary
policy of large scale housing construction in order to relieve
the immediate urban crisis, among the low-income population. The
housing policies such as housing bond issuing, public saving fund
establishment, and long-term low-interest installment plan
initiated for developing rural areas was based on this idea.
There are two common obstacles in developing countries for imple-
menting the large-scale subsidary plan: (1) Under the exploitated
relation of development between the foreign capitalist power and
developing countries, the primitive accumulation of public capital
is very slow. Few of the developing state can afford to implement
any large scale subsidized housing development plan. (2) The
productive force in most developing countries is still very low;
moreover, under the exploitation of foreign capitalists, the
national bourgeousis and the state, the social majority of low
income classes is too poor to afford any payment of public subsi-
dized plan that the state offers to solve their housing problems.
The housing crisis is the common urban nightmare for most develop-
ing countries.
-150-
C. Conclusion- Critique Of The Regional Development Strategy And
Housing Development
The Basis for Taiwan's development was established during
the late colonial period under Japanese control. At that time,
the capitalist mo.de of production had been formed in Taiwan's
society within the colonial mode in both agricultural and industri-
al sectors. In the agricultural sector, most of Taiwan's culti-
vated land and forests had been raped by colonial government and
Japanese capitalists through political and military domination.
The colonial government was then the biggest landlord in Taiwan.
Through the policies of heavy tax and monopoly of all the necessary
raw materials and market, all the surplus value of production
went into the coffers of Japanese imperialists. In the industrial
sector, all the important industries and manufacturing business
were monopolized by colonial government in conjunction with
Japanese capitalists. The capitalist mode of production was
established on the basis of the colonial relation of production.
The pains of urbanization appeared during this period, with hous-
ing problems in the urban sectors. The colonial government ignored
the problems of housing development because it still had not
reached the serious stage.
After Taiwan's recovery by Chinese in 1945, the nationalist
government began to implement " national capitalism ". All the
monopoly industries and manufacturing business of colonial govern-
ment took over by nationalist government and all the agricultural
land and forest of colonial government and Japanese capitalist
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also transferred to public property. But the colonial social
relation of Droduction remained intact.
After the retreat from mainland China to Taiwan in 1949, the
nationalist government began to focus on Taiwan's development.
Along with the nationalist came U.S. influence and interests.
Under massive economic support by U.S. Aid program, the government
began to strengthen the monopoly industries and business. At the
same time, government also realized that the existing relation of
production in agricultural sector seriously hindered the develop-
ment of agricultural force of production. Therefore, a series of
" Land Reform " policy was implemented in order to improve agri-
cultural productivity. Unchanged was the policy of heavy tax and
strict control of supplies and market for production because the
agricultural sector was the most important source for public
capital accumulation. The result was an increase in productivity,
but the farmers' livelihood remained at the subsistance level.
Under U.S Aid, U.S. influence had penetrated all the public
institute because huge amount of U.S. capital in the guise of
U.S. Aid program invested into the full spectrum of public economy.
The rapid growth of public monopoly business and strict control of
both political and military force stablized Taiwan's economic and
social structure. After 1960, the private foreign investment
intruded, and these investments increased rapidly after 1965. Over
50% of these capital were from U.S. and Japan. Because of the
magnitude of foreign investment, most of the important industries
were controlled by foreign interests. Even the public monopoly
industries and business had been seriously infiltrated by foreign
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financial power due to the continuous inflow of foreign loan. The
foreign capitalists exploitated tremendous amount of surplus value
from Taiwan's. Moreover, they directed Taiwan's development
through the financial control. Therefore, Taiwan's Major indus-
tries still remained at the labor-intensive stage.
Taiwan's housing crisis had its origins in " antagonism
between town and country ". The antagonism was caused primarily
by government's development policies. The " Land Reform " policy
stimulated the development of agricultural productivity during mid-
50's, but the policy of heavy tax and control of supplies and
market became the major fetters for the continuous development of
productive force in the agricultural sector. After the enactment
of encouragement act for foreign investment in 1960, government
began to execute a agricultural policy of strict control to depress
product price in order to create a low wage benefit for the en-
couragement of foreign investment. The unequal conditions of de-
velopment between the agricultural and industrial sectors resulted.
Following the rapid inflow of foreign capital and the booming
development of foreign invested industries, the gap between the
agricultural and industrial sectors became abysmal. The antagomism
between urban and rural sectors became more and more acute. Large
numbers of rural youths migrated to urban areas and to joine the
urban proletarin class. The urban housing probelm grew increasing-
ly serious since the mid-50's. Some development experts of U.S.
Aid program actually perceired the serious effect of housing crisis
and began to initiated a series of subsidized development plan for
low-income majority (RLPHC). Large amounts of U.S. capital were
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loaned to government with very low interest-for housing construc-
tion serveral years later. The government then loaned this
capital to low-income family for housing construction with much
higher interest and with a much shorter installment period. At
the same year of the establishment of RLPHC, the government also
set up a long-term, low-interest subsidized program of housing
construction for government bureaucrat. The interest of this
program is much lower than that of loan program for low-income
citizens, and the installment period of this program is twice
large than that of loan program for low income citizens. Five
years later, the government reaped more than five times profit
from the loan program for low-income citizens. In spite these
factors, most of the public housing fund went to housing contruc-
tion for bureacrats and government employees. These facts in-
dicate two basic concepts of public housing construction:
(1) The government considered this kinds of projects as an public
investment instead of social welfare program disregarding the fact
that the majority of low-income classes were too poor to afford
this expanse to improve their living condition. (2) The govern-
ment considered public housing construction as an instrument for
statlizing the ruling classes in society and to enforce the ruling
power. Both the RMPHC and the newly revised RMPHC reflected gov-
ernment's narrow priorities.
Under the exploitation of foreign capitalists, national
bourgeoisis in conjuction with governmental policy, low-income
majority in Taiwan became poorer and poorer. It becomes more and
more impossible for them to maintain a decent standard of living.
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The housing crisis in Taiwan: " Is there any solution for this
coming crisis under the existing ststem?" is the most pressing
problem that any Taiwan planner would have to face in the years to
come.
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Table I-l Position of Agriculture in Taiwan Economy
1912 1922 1931 1935
Total population 3,502 3,905 4,808 5,297(in thousands)
Agriculture 2,199 2,222 2,583 2,790
population
(in thousands)
Percent of total 63 57 54 53
value of output 146 354 440 681(in million yens)
Value of 93 183 220 361
agriculture
products
(in million yens)
Percent of total 63 53 48 53
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Table 1-2 Distribution and changes in the ownership of Farmland
Number of Households
1921
Less than 1/2 cha 172,931
More than 1/2 cha 81,711
More than 1 cha 99,152
Less than 2 cha 330,381
More than 3 t1ha 23,276
More than 5 cha 14,891
More than 10 cha 7,649
More than 50 cha 572
Total 405,181
1932
130,732
71,181
91,524
265,764
23,641
15,324
8,497
Percent of Total
1921
42.68
21.40
81.54
5.74
3.68
1.89
-- 775
340,674 100.00
1932
38.37
20.89
26.86
78.01
6.65
4.50
2.50
0.23
100.00
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Table 1-3 Farm Size vs Number of Household and Area
No. of
households
Less than
1 : ha
Less than
1/2 cha
1/2 cha -
1 cha
1 cha -
3 cha
3 cha -
5 cha
5 cha -
10 cha
More than
10 cha
10 cha t,
20 cha
20 cha -
30 cha
30 cha -
50 cha
50 cha -
100 cha
More than
100 cha
Total
259,642
172,931
86,711
99,151
23,276
14,891
8,211
5,454
1,353
842
376
196
405,181
area(cha)
103,000
40,987
62,513
196,889
88,672
101,066
258,123
73,722
32,995
31,837
25,497
94,072
721,252
per cent
of total
household
64.08
42.68
21.40
24.47
5.:47
3.68
2.03
1.35
0.33
per cent of
total area
14.31
5.68
8.67
23.55
12.29
14.01
35.80
10.22
4.57
0.21
0.09
0.05
100.00
3.34
13.06
100.00
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Table 1-4 Farm Ownership Pattern
Number of Households Percentage of Total
part-
tenant total owner owner tenant
1922 116,300 111,512
1926 114,599 119,322
1928 118,280 124,521
157,065 385,277
161,897 395,818
162,682 405,483
30 29
29 30
29 31
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owner
part
owner
41
40
Taiwan Trade Figure (in thousands of yen)
Year
1897
1903
1908
1913
1917
1922
1925
1929
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
Per centExport to Japan
2,105
9,729
24,423
40,436
105,497
127,301
215,249
238,705
201,424
222,683
230,747
279,410
314,200
358,894
Total Export
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of
19
49
63
73
74
76
77
79
86
88
88
88
87
89
Table I-5
Table 1-6 - Major Exports to Japan (in thousands of yen)
Rice
Sugar
(A) Total
Banana
Tea
Honey
Salt
Dried fish
Canned pineapple
(B) Total
Camphor
Camphor Oil
Alcohol
Hemp product
Hat
Card board
Coal
Copper
Ore
Cypress
(C) Total
1925
72,110
105,651
177,751
9,096
121
18
1,240
1,322
1,918
13,715
915
2,468
3,855
577
96
1,901
839
2,196
14,262
1933
64,628
118,614
183,242
7,899
623
858
1,063
470
15,704
1,714
1,555
5,455
62
2,574
259
1,195
6,144
2,084
20,500
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Table I- 7 Taiwan's Major Imports from Japan (in thousands
of yen)
1925 1933
Grain and grain flour 22,353 6,697
Wheat flour 3,936 3,414
Tobacco and drinks 25,667 30,007
Fishery 10,221 8,954
(A) Total 47,930 36,104
Oil and fat 4,768 7,756
Mineral oil 1,917 3,705
Pharmaceutic 4,9O2 7,812
Paint 982 1,665
(B) Total 10,652 17,233
Fibre materials 2,932 3,387
Cotton cloth 20,604 25,021
Silk product 15,708 17,250
(C) Total 23,536 28,408
Ore and metal 7,535 13,422
Iron 7,402 11,517
Metal product 5,438 9,592
Watch, vehicle 6,137 17,152
and machiney
Bicycle 1,225 2,346
Car '231 3,622
(D) Total 19,110 40,166
(E) Miscellaneous 15,416 34,479
Lumber 3,421 8,765
Other fertilizer 3,801 8,937
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Table 1-8 Comparison of the Wages of Taiwanese and Japanese
Workers (in yens)
maximum
Taiwanese Japanese
minimum
Taiwanese Japanese
Flour worker
Noodle worker
Soysauce
maker
Pickle and
Sauce maker
Lathe
operaror
Carpenter
Forger
Weaver
Dyer
1.00
1.10
1.30
1.30
1.80
1.80
1.80
1.12
1.50
1.40
1.50
1.50
1.50
2.85
2.64
2.52
1.60
2.40
(source:"Old Taiwan Governor-office Survey,
Political Economy of Taiwan")
o.6o
0.60
0.70
o.6o
1.20
1.22
1.00
0.40
1.00
1935" in Fan,
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Food
Processing
Machinary
Industry
Textile
Industry
1.80
2.00
1.80
0.70
1.35
"The
Table II-1
U.S. ECONOMIC AID OBLIGATIONS BY STATUTORY INSTRUMENT, FY 1951-65(In Millions of U.S. Dollars)
GrandInstrument of Aid 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 Total
I. Project 13.7 13.4 21.1 31. 36.ju1 28.1 42.9 227 5r.4 31 24.4 8.2 2.0 5925 0.6 400.7
Defense support 11.4 10.2 16.0 23.1 28.6 24.7 39.3 26.6 22.0 30.7 5.7 - - - - 218.3Direct forces 0.6 2.3 3.2 5.0 5.1 0.1 0.2 - - - - - - - - 16.5Technical cooperation 1.7 0.9 2.2 3.6 2.4 3-3 3.4 3.1 2.6 2.5 2.0 - - - - 27.7Development grant - - - - - - - . - - - - 3.0 2.0 2.1 0.6 7.7Development loan 
- - . - - - - - 30.8 20.4 16.7 5.2 - 57.4 - 130.5
II. Nonproject 6 69 : 7: .76.6 22: 735 64.0 52.0 69.1 7. 2.1 82.6 84.0 42.1 1,064.7
Agriculture 495 4 5 55.6 53-2 54.4 57.2 52.0 59.0 44.0 60.2 6 1 6 42.1 816.2
Defense support 48.7 42.3 45.5 43.6 43-1 35.4 30-9 33.3 36.4 30.7 29.7 - - - - 419.6Direct forces 0.8 2.5 6.1 11.5 7.5 9.4 6.5 1.6 - - - - - - - 45.9PL 48o - 0.4 - 0.5 2.6 9.6 19.8 17.1 22.6 13-3 30.4 59.1 62.9 68.8 42.1 349.2Program loan - - - - - - - 0.8 0.7 - 1.5
Nonagriculture 20.2 24.3 27.6 21.0 42.7 1.1 6.8 - 10.1 3 12.8 - 18.9 14.5 -
Defense support 16.1 11.7 10.3 11.0 25.8 18.6 6.8 - 10-1 30.5 12.8 - - - - 153.7Direct forces 4.1 12.6 17.3 10.0 16.9 0.5 - - - - - - - - - 61.4Program loan 
- - - - - - - - - - - - 18.9 14.5 - 33.4
III. GRAND TOTAL 83.4 82. 100.6 108. 132.0 101.6 106.9 124.5 108. 1 2 67 84.6 642.7 1j5.4
Source: U.S. AID Mission to China, FY 1951-64: actual obligations as of June 30, 1964; F! 1965: programmed as ofApril 15, 1965.
Table 11-2
PERCENTAES OF TOTAL U.S. ECONCHIC AID PROVIDED BY STATUTORY INSTRUMENT, FY 1951-1965
Instrument of Aid 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 Total
I. Project 16.4 16.2 21.3 2.3 27.3 27.6 40.1 36. 44.5 311 251 12.2 2_.4 41.5 1.5 273
Defense support
Direct forces
Technical cooperation
Development grant-
Development loan
II. Nonproject
Agriculture
Defense support
Direct forces
PL 480
Program loan
Non-agriculture
Defense support
Direct forces
Program loan
III. GRAND TOTAL
13.7 12-3 15.9 21.3 21.7 24-3 36.8 32.6 17.7 9.9 5.8 - - - -
0.7 2.8 .3.2 4.6 3.9 0.1 0.2 - - - - - - - -
2.0 1.1 2.2 3.3 1.8 3-2 3.2 3.8 2.1 2.3 2.1 - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - 4.4 2.4 1.5 1.4
- - - - - - - - 24.7 18.9 17.2 7.7 - 4o.o -
83.6 83.8 787 707 72.6 72.3 59., 6-6 Q . 74.9 87.8 97.6 58.5 98-5
2 i. 54- 1-3 43 3 3 636 4.4 40.7 61.8 87 . 48.4 28.
58.3 51.0 45.2 40.2 32.6 34.8 28.9 40.8 29.2 28.4 30.5 .- - - -
0-9 3.0 6.1 10.6 5.7 9.2 6.1 2.0 - - - - - - -
- 0.6 - 0.5 2.0 9.4 18.5 20.9 18.2 12.3 31.2 87.8 74.3 47.9 98.6
- - - - - - - -- - - - - 0-9 0.5 -
24.2 2 27.4 19.4 18.8 6.4 - 28.2 13.2 - 22.3 10
19.3 14.1 10.2- 10.2 19.5 18.3 6.4 - 8.1 28.2 13.2 - - - -
4.9 15.2 17.2 9.2 12.8 .5 - - - - - - - -
- - - - '- - - - . - - - 22.3 10.4 -
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 10b.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
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14.9
1.1
1.9
.5
8.9
251
23.6
3.1
23.8
.1
17.0
10.5
4.2
2.3
a
Table 11-3
TSusLLIOS
20000
CONSOLIDATED GOVERNMENT REVENUES
8 EXPENDITURES. 1951-1964
15000
10000
5000
0
FY51 52 53 54 55 56 57 56 59 60 61 62 63 64
Table II-4
U.S. CAPITAL ASSISTANCE OBLIGATIONS AND NET DOMESTIC INVESTMENT
BY MAJOR SECTORS, 1951-63
(In U.S. Dollar Equivalents)
Net Domestic Investment U.S.- Capital Per Cent of U.S. Capital
Assistance Assistance to
Sector Domestic investment
Amount Per Cent Amount Per Cent
(millions) (millions)
Inrsrutr $41 1 5 -$ 35 44 0
Agriculture
Human resources
Industry
TOTALS
%sAblic
Pyd vate
TOTALS
329
577
1,218
$2,605
$1,253
1,353
$2,605
12.6
22.1
46.8
100.0
48.0
52.0
100.0
193
104
157
$ 810
$ 649
161
$ 810
23.8
12.8
19.4
100.0
80.1
19.9
100.0
14.0
58.7
18.0
12.9
31.1
51.7
41.8
31.1
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